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ABSTRACT 
Determining the role information sharing should play in operations has plagued 
policymakers since the United States’ days of isolationism. Such sharing has the potential 
to either help or hinder any type of operation. This thesis looks at that role specifically 
with regards to counterproliferation operations. The purpose is to determine if we can 
prevent the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) material and related 
technology by improving working relationships with allies via intelligence sharing. 
Moreover, if increasing intelligence sharing creates a more effective collective security 
action, then why is the United States very selective with whom and what it shares? 
Specifically, what are the risks and how do we minimize them? This thesis looks at three 
distinct cases where intelligence sharing has either helped or hindered 
counterproliferation operations in order to determine the relationship between the level 
and nature of sharing and the probability of success. The premise of this thesis is that 
increased information sharing among allies causes more effective security cooperation 
and is therefore necessary for combating the spread of WMD. Therefore, identifying and 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. IMPORTANCE OF INTELLIGENCE SHARING WITH ALLIES 
Information has played an integral role in the evolution of society since the 
beginning of time. It could also lead to its ultimate destruction if not properly managed. 
By sharing information with other nation-states, the United States fosters the growth of 
security management institutions and alliances, which ultimately leads to an increase in 
our own national security. Conversely, if we share information, albeit with benign 
intentions, to those who do not share the same interests as the United States, then the 
information shared could be used against the United States or its allies. 
The purpose of this thesis is to show how information sharing impacts 
counterproliferation efforts and make recommendations on how to increase the amount of 
information shared among allies while minimizing the associated risks.  Specifically, this 
thesis will attempt to address the question: can we prevent the spread of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (WMD) material and related technology by improving working 
relationships with allies via sharing intelligence? Does increasing information sharing 
lead to a more effective collective security action? The initial hypothesis of this thesis is 
that increased information sharing among allies causes more effective security 
cooperation and is therefore necessary for combating the spread of WMD. Although 
cultural differences and technical obstacles restrict the amount of information shared, 
these issues can be overcome in order to improve global security. More importantly, 
overcoming these challenges is imperative in preventing the spread of WMD.  
At the outset, a point of clarification must be made. This thesis uses the word 
information synonymously with the word intelligence even though there is considerable 
difference in definition. In particular, information, in its simplest form, is nothing more 
than data that is eventually processed into knowledge. It is what “we know”. Yet, 
knowing doesn’t always equate to intelligence. Intelligence is the collection of multiple 
sources of information that may allow a person to predict an action or formulate 
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possibilities that may reduce uncertainty and assist in a course of action. Therefore, “all 
intelligence is information; not all information is intelligence.”1 Information, not 
necessarily intelligence, is shared all the time. The U.S. military openly shares training 
procedures with civil authorities as well as foreign militaries. Furthermore, scientists 
openly share certain advances in medicine, robotics, and other means of research. 
Intelligence, however, is not easily shared. The military does not routinely offer signal 
intelligence capabilities to foreign partners. Similarly, politicians do not normally share 
sources and methods of intelligence collection such as the location and names of CIA 
operatives with other states. Given these facts, it is not simply information but 
“intelligence information” sharing which affects security.  
The United States must work with allies and share resources, such as information, 
in order to maintain and possibly increase global security. Information is “a critical power 
resource”2 that gives whoever controls it the ability to wage and win wars, avoid war 
altogether, or control the stream of criminal activities. In particular, sharing intelligence 
increases the ability of allies to avoid war by providing warning signs or indicators of 
potential future conflict. Intelligence sharing also supports the prevention of criminal 
activities and, most notably, the spread of weapons of mass destruction.  
For example, in June 1976 an organization known as the Terrorism, Radicalisme, 
Extremisme et Violence Internationale (TREVI) was formed within Europe as a means to 
facilitate the sharing of information. It served those within the European Community for 
a substantial period and helped facilitate the creation of the European Union.3 Similarly, a 
September 1997 agreement between the United States and Germany has aided in the 
prevention of several crimes and the capture of numerous criminals. This agreement 
allowed for the German criminal unit or Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) to connect with a 
                                                 
1 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2003), 2. 
2 Joseph S. Nye Jr., Power in the Globalization Information Age: From Realism to Globalization (New 
York, N.Y., Routledge, 2004), 75. 
3 Dieter Mahncke, Wyn Rees, and Wayne C. Thompson, Redefining transatlantic security relations: 
The Challenge of Change (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2004), 165–166.  
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U.S. criminal database in order to view files on any known criminal suspect.4 In this case, 
the bilateral agreement’s success rested on information sharing. 
Likewise, since the end of the Cold War the United States and its allies have been 
facing the threat of the spread of WMD technology and related material. Various treaties, 
initiatives, and organizations have been formed to prevent the shipment of these 
materials. The most recent counterproliferation efforts, such as the Proliferation Security 
Initiative (PSI), also rely heavily on intelligence sharing in order to be successful. 
Notably, it has been stated that an institution such as the International Atomic Energy 
Association “would be quickly overwhelmed if it tried on its own to track all the potential 
traffic…that might, or might not, be used to make nuclear components.”5 Thus, the 
United States must increase the amount and quality of intelligence shared if it wants to 
increase the effectiveness of multinational counterproliferation operations. 
In order to investigate the hypothesis that intelligence sharing does play a role in 
security cooperation, this thesis asks the question does sharing intelligence actually have 
any effect on counterproliferation operations? The cases selected for this thesis will look 
at the legal, political, and intelligence sharing challenges encountered during their 
specific counterproliferation activity and focus on the impacts these challenges had on the 
case outcome. In particular, these cases will be used to assess the hypothesis that 
intelligence sharing has a substantial impact on counterproliferation operations.  
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Theorists often view intelligence sharing as an intervening and not a direct causal 
variable when it comes to maintaining security relations. Therefore, the literature 
reviewed for this thesis begins with a discussion of research on security cooperation in 
general but then turns to research on how intelligence sharing impacts security as well as 
                                                 
4 Mahncke et al., 193. 
5 Mark Hosenball and Christopher Dickey. "Risky Business; PyongYang Isn't about to Give Up its 
Weapons. The Challenge Now is to Find More Effective Ways to Uncover and Squeeze the Illicit Trade in 
Nuclear Technology." Newsweek, October 30, 2006 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1150858271&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD 
(accessed March 2007). 
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the associated risks and benefits. For example, according to Helga Haftendorn, Robert 
Keohane, and Celeste Wallander’s Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and 
Space, institutions are created in order to reduce or eliminate threats, risks, and/or 
uncertainty of others’ intentions.6 These institutions mitigate uncertainties by making 
intentions clear and governance transparent. It is because of this that, according to 
Haftendorn, “information becomes an instrument of security policy whether a state 
wishes to avoid conflict or to exercise influence over the behavior of others.”7 
Similar to Haftendorn et al.’s argument is Janne E. Nolan’s argument that 
government transparency and reciprocity are two key elements of successful security 
management institutions and alliances.8  In Global Engagement: Cooperation and 
Security in the 21st Century, Nolan makes the argument that the amount of transparency a 
government is willing to have is dependent upon the availability, accessibility, and 
reliability of information being shared and the probability of that act being reciprocated.9 
In essence, openly sharing information leads to transparency, which breaks down barriers 
of distrust among foreign partners, and promotes reciprocity or the glue that maintains 
these bonds.  
Specifically, with regard to counterproliferation efforts, Jason D. Ellis and 
Geoffrey D. Kiefer argue, in Combating Proliferation: Strategic Intelligence and Security 
Policy, that the United States’ intelligence community needs to “increase its information-
sharing arrangements both on a bilateral basis and with international organizations” in 
order to continue successful interdiction operations.10 Such operations are needed 
because “the intricate network of nonproliferation treaties and regimes built over the past 
several decades…have not prevented determined states from developing [WMD]…or 
                                                 
6 Helga Haftendorn, Robert Keohane, and Celeste Wallander, Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions 
over Time and Space (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 1999), 1. 
7 Ibid, 4. 
8 Janne E. Nolan and John D. Steinbruner, “A Transition Strategy for the 1990s,” in Global 
Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century. Edited by Janne E. Nolan, 583 (Washington, 
DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994). 
9 Ibid., 66. 
10 Jason D. Ellis and Geoffrey D. Kiefer, Combating Proliferation: Strategic Intelligence and Security 
Policy (Baltimore and London, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 15.  
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related delivery systems.”11 Because there are networks of cooperation among those 
seeking to acquire WMD, it is highly improbable, if not counterproductive, for the United 
States to try to unilaterally attack the issue of WMD proliferation. However, Ellis and 
Kiefer also argue “there is an inherent tension between sharing sensitive information with 
partners in U.S. efforts to counter WMD proliferation and the protection of intelligence 
sources and methods.”12 Additionally, sometimes the risks of intelligence sharing 
outweigh the benefits causing information to be restricted from foreign partners. In 
particular, Ellis and Kiefer use the case study of Russian nuclear and missile transfers to 
Iran to illustrate the challenges found when conducting intelligence sharing. In their case 
study they show that intelligence shared was risky and, at times, negatively impacted the 
prevention of WMD technology transfers to Iran.  
Other risks stem from differences in experience and policies between the United 
States and its allies. In Redefining Transatlantic Security Relations, by Dieter Mahncke, 
Wyn Rees, and Wayne C. Thompson, it is argued that these differences coupled with 
globalization have led to a plethora of intelligence sharing challenges with transatlantic 
allies.13 However, if these obstacles can be overcome and a common frame of reference 
can be built among allies then the United States can conduct more effective operations 
against common threats. Similarly, Richard J. Aldrich argues, in an International Affairs 
article, that “intelligence and security cooperation continues to be problematic because 
there is a fundamental tension between an increasingly networked world…and highly 
compartmentalized national intelligence-gathering.”14 It is his contention that intelligence 
is often withheld from the international community because Americans not only want to 
protect their sources, but they also have different notions of privacy. Similarly, 
Americans cannot agree with allies on what constitutes a threat or indication of a threat. 
Yet these issues of intelligence exchange are resolvable and intelligence cooperation is 
one of the most important weapons the United States can use to combat global threats.  
                                                 
11 Ellis and Kiefer, 18. Emphasis in original quote. 
12 Ibid., 109–110. 
13 Mahncke et al. 
14 Richard J. Aldrich, “Transatlantic intelligence and security cooperation,” International Affairs, 80, 
no. 4 (2004): 731–753. 
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Therefore, it is my contention, based on the literature reviewed, that intelligence 
sharing is important not only in order for security institutions to survive but also in order 
to effectively conduct counterproliferation operations. Specifically, by examining cases 
where intelligence sharing has affected the outcome of operations this importance can be 
seen. Notably, this thesis will look at the BBC China incident, where good intelligence 
sharing led to a successful interdiction operation. Conversely, this thesis will also look at 
case of the So San, where good intelligence sharing still led to a failed interdiction 
operation. Lastly, this thesis will look at the controversial failure of the United States to 
share intelligence with allies before going to war in Iraq and how this intelligence failure 
coupled with its ambition to act unilaterally has cost the United States in terms of its 
credibility. Yet, if intelligence sharing had only positive consequences there would 
presumably be more of it. Hence, it is also necessary to discuss possible risks that prevent 
or limit intelligence sharing. 
C. POSSIBLE RISKS 
Considering the U.S.’s ability to gather and analyze information in order to 
produce actionable intelligence, it is astonishing that the United States does not use this 
strength to its fullest capacity. One reason there is not greater intelligence sharing lies in 
the possible risks involved. Policy makers are especially inhibited by three risks:  
inadvertent sharing with unintended recipients, credibility, and possible disclosure of 
sources and methods. 
Inadvertent sharing is probably the most common of the three. This is the fear that 
information shared with benign intentions to one state may be shared by that state to a 
potential rival of the United States. This fear can be best understood as a twist to the 
adage “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” expressed as “the friend of my friend might 
be my enemy.” A case that illustrates this is when sensitive technology was inadvertently 
shared between U.S. companies Loral Space and Communications, Ltd. and Hughes 
Space and Communications International, Inc. and China during commercial space 
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launch projects in 1999.15 The shared information helped China develop the capability to 
“design and improve reliable future silo-based or mobile PRC ballistic missiles...with 
advanced payloads (that is, multiple warheads, or certain penetration aids designed to 
defeat missile defenses), and submarine launched ballistic missiles.”16 Inadvertent 
sharing such as this led to policy makers questioning the sharing of any and all sensitive 
information. In particular, the above example has made it difficult for the United States to 
help its ally, India, in the development of commercial satellite and space launch 
capabilities designed to bolster economic modernization.17 In this case the United States’ 
security concerns impeded efforts to improve relations with India.  
Similarly, in March 2007 the Virginia based corporation, ITT, was fined $100 
million by the U.S. State Department for illegally sending technological data for military 
night vision goggles to China, the United Kingdom, and Singapore.18 Additionally, the 
corporation provided false documents about the transfer seriously jeopardizing U.S. 
national security. Even more devastating was the fact that the investigation against this 
illegal sale revealed that in 2001 the corporation transferred technical data about a “light 
interference filter” to Singapore who then sent that same data to the United Kingdom and 
finally to China without proper authorization or licensing agreements. 
Another risk that plagues policy makers is the question of how information shared 
will affect the United States’ credibility. A way to illustrate this is to think back to the 
story of the “Boy Who Cried Wolf.” Just as that boy soon lost his credibility among the 
other farmers, the United States fears losing its credibility will result in the lack of 
assistance by other states when it matters most. Notably, this occurred when the United 
                                                 
15 Larry M. Wortzel and Dana R. Dillon. "Improving Relations with India without Compromising U.S. 
Security." American Heritage Foundation (December 11, 2000) 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/BG1402.cfm#pgfId-1114065 (accessed March 2007); 
Richard D. Fisher, Jr., "Time to Heed the Cox Commission's Wake-Up Call," Heritage Foundation 
Executive Memorandum No. 602 (June 3, 1999). 
16 Ibid. Quote taken from the Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and 
Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China, U.S. House of Representatives, 106th 
Congress, 1st Session, Vol. III (May 25, 1999): 170–172. 
17 Wortzel and Dillon. 
18 Brooke Masters. "ITT Fined $100m for Sale of Military Technology." MSNBC.Com in New York 
Financial Times (March 27, 2007) http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17816832/ (accessed March 2007). 
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States made sweeping claims that Iraq had large scale weapons of mass destruction 
programs. However, after Iraq’s government fell and no WMD were uncovered, this 
caused the United States to lose credibility within the international community. In 
particular, although the United States has gained intelligence that Iran has weapons of 
mass destruction in addition to being a state sponsor of terrorism, the international 
community refuses to publicly support any military intervention into Iran based on U.S. 
intelligence due to the faulty intelligence about Iraq which led to what some of those 
states believe to have been an unnecessary war. Furthermore, according to Lowenthal, 
“failure to find an Iraqi WMD arsenal despite intelligence estimates that it existed has 
probably raised the bar for the level of intelligence that will be required before the next 
confrontation with any potential proliferator.”19 
The third and most serious risk that causes hesitation about information sharing is 
the probability of disclosing sources and/or methods when sharing intelligence. 
Accordingly, the protection of sources and methods is why the United States classifies 
and, at times, over classifies its intelligence. According to the National Security Act of 
1947 the Director of Central Intelligence is responsible “for protecting intelligence 
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.”20 However, there have been times 
that the United States has determined that the benefit derived from sharing intelligence 
outweighed the risks of possibly disclosing sources and methods. For example, according 
to Ellis and Keifer every time the United States disclosed intelligence that showed 
Russians conducting missile transfers to Iran, the Russian government would first deny 
the allegations then try to determine where that information came from and close it off.21 
Additionally, some of the open source literature reviewed by Keifer indicated that there 
has been “at least one instance in which a clandestine source was eliminated as a result of 
intelligence passed to Russian authorities.”22  
                                                 
19 Lowenthal, 239. 
20 U.S. Code Congressional Service, Laws of the 80th Congress, 1st session. (St Paul, MN: West 
Publishing Co., 1947): 502. 
21 Ellis and Kiefer, 122. 
22 Ibid.  
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The United States consistently attempts to balance this need for protecting sources 
and methods with the need to share intelligence by passing along information that has 
been sanitized so as to not give away how this information was gathered. In particular, 
U.S. Navy’s Pacific Fleet (PACFLT) jointly operates with numerous foreign 
organizations effectively. This is done by having those who want to either participate or 
benefit from intelligence gathered by the United States Navy sign a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) with PACFLT as a formal way of showing that they understand 
that any information they may share could be shared with others who have also signed 
the MOU.23 Similarly, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) has its members sign a 
Statement of Interdiction Principles publicly endorsing the PSI and its efforts to include 
the sharing of information among its members. Additionally, the PSI addressed the issue 
of inadvertent sharing by stating that intelligence gathered would only be shared with 
those states that will be involved in the actual interdiction effort and only through an 
identified and appropriate point of contact designated by the state providing the 
intelligence.24 This resolved the issue of inadvertent leakage of information to states 
deemed to not have a need to know. In addition to these widely recognized risks, 
however, other barriers may exist that prevent or limit information sharing. 
D. BARRIERS TO SHARING INTELLIGENCE 
Risk aversion is not the only reason intelligence is often restricted from allies. No 
matter the steps taken to mitigate the inherent risks, policy makers and members of the 
intelligence community are still quick to identify other reasons for not sharing 
intelligence. The underlying reluctance to share information is sometimes referred to as a 
“Cold War mentality.” These barriers can be parsed into four categories, although there is 
some overlap. I label these four categories of barriers as: technological, behavioral, 
cultural, and political.  
                                                 
23  Information derived during VTC session with CAPT Pete Smith, USN, PACFLT N2 on  March 8, 
2007. 
24 Andrew C. Winner, “The Proliferation Security Initiative: The New Face of Interdiction,” The 
Washington Quarterly (Spring 2005): 130–132. 
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1. Technological 
Technology can create barriers to intelligence sharing. One major concern is how 
to share information with those not deemed eligible to receive it because of the level of 
classification. For example, the United States military shares much of its classified 
information via a secured Internet connection or SIPRNET. The SIPRNET works just 
like regular Internet yet it transmits over NSA approved encryption systems. Therefore it 
is not possible to transmit from regular Internet to SIPRNET and vice versa. This system 
is not readily available for purchase. It is a U.S. government-controlled system that 
constantly changes its encryption and is heavily monitored for compliance. Thus, it is not 
a tool that is readily available for all agencies, let alone foreign partners. Moreover, 
sharing this technology would give away our system capabilities to foreign governments 
that may or may not still be our allies in the future. This paradox is what most 
intelligence personnel give as the reason for not sharing intelligence. In other words, they 
believe that they cannot effectively share if they do not have the means to share, but they 
cannot share the technology because it will give others possible access to other classified 
pieces of information. 
However, the truth is that technology has actually played a very influential role in 
promoting information flow. For example, based on some of the critiques from the 9/11 
Commission Report on poor information sharing, steps have been taken to use current 
technology to alleviate some of these problems. John Negroponte, then Director of 
National Intelligence, introduced one such type in October 2006. This system known as 
“Intellipedia” is a spin off of the “Wikipedia” concept. “Intellipedia” works the same 
way, allowing different agencies the ability to input what they know and have access to 
what others know. The secure technology and protocals prevent that information from 
being possibly leaked or even accessed illegally. The Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence (ODNI) is working on that issue and states that in the future there will be 
Sensitive but Unclassified, Secret, and Top Secret versions.25 Additionally, access to this 
                                                 
25 Eben Kaplan, “Intel Community Gets a Wiki,” Council on Foreign Relations (November 10, 2006) 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/11981/intel_community_gets_a_wiki.html (accessed November 2006). 
Emphasis on the classification codes is done by this author. 
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information will soon be available to “select U.S. allies, like Britain, Australia, and 
Canada.”26  Similarly, the United States Strategic Command uses a secured version of 
this “Intellipedia” known as “SKI Web” or “Shared Knowledge Initiative” that can be 
accessed over a secured internet connection and is available to all allies who have access 
to a secured internet connection.  
Yet having access to this intelligence causes another dilemma in information 
sharing. According to Joseph Nye Jr., “technological advances have led to a dramatic 
reduction in the cost of processing and transmitting information.”27 Although, at first 
glance this would seem as more of a benefit than a barrier, this free flow of information 
has led to what Herbert A. Simon calls the “paradox of plenty.”28 In other words as the 
amount of information has increased, the amount of attention given to that information 
has decreased. This overloading of information often leads to information being either 
overlooked or disregarded as unimportant by analysts. 
To combat this overloading of information, the United States has taken steps 
towards creating a software program designed to “sift through troves of images and 
intelligence data.”29 Since it is not physically possible for a person or number of persons 
to sift through all available data fast enough to make intelligence actionable, the U.S. 
Department of Defense is developing software known as the “Control of Agent-Based 
Systems or CoABS.”30 Yet it has often been contended that any software is only as good 
as the person who inputs the data or interprets the results from all the data mining. Given 
these facts it is easy to see that although it can be argued that technology does play a role 
                                                 
26 Eben Kaplan, “Intel Community Gets a Wiki,” Council on Foreign Relations (November 10, 2006) 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/11981/intel_community_gets_a_wiki.html (accessed November 2006). 
Emphasis on the classification codes is done by this author. There is a link to a report done on the same 
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27 Joesph S. Nye Jr., Soft Power (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2004),105. 
28 Ibid.  
29 Jim Krane. "Military Tests Software Agents for Quick Intelligence." Washington Times (October 1, 
2001) sec. D, http://www.gcn.com/print/25_27/41900-1.html (accessed March 2007). 
30 Ibid.  
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in preventing intelligence sharing, it not the only barrier. As a professor at the Naval 
Postgraduate School once said, “technology changes, human behavior doesn’t.”31 
2.  Behavioral 
The core behavioral barrier to effective information sharing is the lack of trust. 
Not all actors can be trusted to safeguard intelligence, but desire to play it safe can lead 
the United States to exclude even trustworthy allies from access to information. It can be 
said that trust should be limited to only allies but there is no way of truly identifying an 
ally. Thomas Barnett once stated that an ally is “basically anyone who agrees with your 
definition of the future threat, or anyone to whom you’ve already sold weapons.”32 Yet, 
Henry Kissinger believed that the United States doesn’t have allies; we have interests. So 
whom do you trust?  
Fears about whom to trust tend to lead to the issue of over-classification of 
information. For example, the New York Times reported that according to a 2006 CRS 
report since 2001 the “Bush administration is classifying the documents to be kept secret 
from public scrutiny at the rate of 125 a minute…[while] the volume of declassified 
material has been decreasing.”33 This rate of classifying information is not only 
staggering; it is also expensive. The Information Security Oversight Office reported that 
in FY 2005, it cost $7.7 billion to cover the classification and declassification process.  
Still, no matter the cost, the need to control sensitive information out of fear of 
who to trust is a substantial problem. Currently the United States uses the terms 
Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret as a means to protect the sources and methods used 
as well as the information itself. The term Confidential is applied to any information that 
                                                 
31 This quote comes from CAPT Timothy Doorey, USN, Senior Intelligence Officer and Professor for 
the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA during his Seminar on Intelligence Analysis, Winter Quarter 
2006. 
32 Thomas P.M. Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map (New York, NY, Berkeley Publishing Group, 
2004), 23. 
33 Harold C. Relyea, “Security Classified and Controlled Information: History, Status, and Emerging 
Management Issue,s” CRS Report for Congress RL33494 (September 22, 2006): 27. 
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may prove damaging to the national security if publicly released.34 The term Secret is 
applied to any information that may cause serious damage and Top Secret to anything 
that “could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage” to national security.35 
Likewise, governmental agencies use document control markings on information that 
does not meet the criteria for regulated classification. Since 1971, there have been over 
58 different forms of information control markings.36 Markings such as: For Official Use 
Only; Limited Official Use; Restricted Data; No Foreign; ROK-U.S. Only; NATO Only; 
No NGO; Eyes Only; Sensitive But Unclassified, etc. have plagued almost every 
document that may, just possibly, contain some shred of information that could possibly 
be detrimental to the security of the United States.  
This tendency to over-classify information makes it extremely difficult for U.S. 
agencies to share information with each other, U.S. allies or with other countries which 
share our interests. Moreover, if the United States continues down this path it may find 
itself in a position of classified information overload and with little or no support from its 
foreign partners. Nowadays it seems that the price of admission for getting any type of 
coalition support is intelligence sharing. The only way to overcome this barrier and 
receive support from allies is to strike at the heart of the problem: human behavior. If the 
United States can figure out how to break down the “Cold War” mentality of many of its 
decision makers and learn to trust its foreign partners, then the relevancy of this barrier 
will be like that of technology: easy to overcome. Still, overcoming a behavioral 
tendency to over classify will require dealing with a third category of barriers I label 
“cultural”.  
3. Cultural  
Cultural differences often reflect differences in experience. Differences in 
experience affect how policies are formulated, which influences what actions are taken. 
According to Mahncke et al., “Although the United States usually seeks multilateral  
                                                 
34 Lowenthal, 58. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Relyea, 4 – 6. 
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solutions to international problems, unilateralism has always been an important 
characteristic of American foreign policy making and is a source of transatlantic 
tensions.”37  
This can be seen in the United States’ approach towards terrorism and weapons of 
mass destruction. Although the United States and its transatlantic allies agree that these 
are important security threats, the United States has a tendency to quickly take unilateral 
preemptive action as opposed to Europe’s multilateral diplomatic measures. This has 
caused tension between the two sides. A difference in experience is one of many root 
causes for this tension. For example, when dealing with terrorism, Europeans have dealt 
with the issue on the home front since much of their experience comes from terrorists 
within their country. Conversely, the United States’ experience with terrorism on the 
home front is limited and has led to their tendency to view terrorism as an external threat 
and one that should be fought in far off lands.  
These differences in experience then translate to differences in foreign policy. If 
we look at the issue of weapons of mass destruction we would see the United States as a 
leader in establishing multilateral agreements to prevent proliferation. Yet the United 
States frequently lacks confidence that these multilateral instruments will be effective. A 
prime example of this, one that will be covered in more depth later in this thesis, is the 
United States’ approach towards Iraq and Iraq’s suspected nuclear program. In this case 
the United States disregarded the requests of international inspectors to continue their 
searching for any sign of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons before initiating a 
preemptive strike against Iraq leading to war. 
These actions have hurt the United States’ reputation and caused other states to 
reconsider whether it is truly wise to share information with the United States, especially 
if this might result in another war. Along those same lines, the United States is wary of 
sharing information with its allies for fear that it will do no good since its allies are 
merely “free-riding” off of America’s military might. Yet, if all benefit from reducing  
 
                                                 
37 Mahncke et al., 153. 
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a global threat such as weapons of mass destruction, would it not behoove all to 
cooperate in preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction? Are we are all not 
combating the same issue?  
Mark Lowenthal argues that the issue lies in balancing the United States’ desire 
for intelligence sharing with secrecy.38 Then again, this balancing act is what has led to 
what Abram Schulsky and Gary Schmitt consider an issue of classification and over 
classification.39 No matter what argument is accepted the question remains: does sharing 
intelligence actually have any effect on counterproliferation operations? If so, then how 
does it affect counterproliferation efforts? If not, then why do it, especially if the risks 
outweigh the benefits and the barriers (or excuses if you prefer) are too great to 
overcome? This leads into the final barrier: Politics.  
4. Political 
A political barrier is nothing more than a self-inflicted wound resulting from the 
use of politicized information in order to achieve a desirable policy outcome. More 
importantly, it directly corresponds with the aforementioned risk of how sharing 
information may detrimentally affect a states’ credibility. To better illustrate how politics 
can actually prevent information sharing or cause credibility issues one need look no 
further than the U.S. led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and Iran’s present desire to acquire 
WMD; this case will be covered in more depth in Chapter IV. 
Mark Lowenthal covers the issue of politicized information at length in the third 
edition of his book Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. Essentially, Lowenthal discusses 
how the U.S. intelligence community would gather and analyze raw information in order 
to produce detailed intelligence and present their findings to decision makers for policy 
formulation. Yet, policy makers would politicize the information by separately taking 
only the information that best suits their politically desirable end state and ignoring 
intelligence which does not. This process is often labeled “cherry picking” and has led to 
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(Washington D.C., Potomac Books, 2006)  
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undesirable outcomes in which the intelligence community, as opposed to the policy 
makers, gets blamed; it also negatively affects U.S. credibility with other states. 
Another way politics creates a barrier to sharing information is through the 
previously discussed classification process. For example, the U.S. intelligence 
community has a tendency to automatically label classified documents as NOFORN, a 
term that implies only U.S. personnel are privy to that piece of information, essentially a 
behavioral barrier addressed earlier. Yet this barrier is not just behavioral it is also done 
so that same information could later be used as a political bargaining chip. In other 
words, we [the U.S.] will share what we know about Country X if Country Y agrees to tell 
the U.S. everything it knows about Country Z’s WMD program. This type of bargaining, 
although it has the potential to be successful, prevents intelligence agencies from openly 
communicating with allies until political arrangements are made. Incidentally, cultural, 
technological, and behavioral barriers are often given as plausible excuses for either not 
sharing enough or sharing erroneous information when these political gains are either not 
made or the outcome was undesirable. Yet, by and large, politics has an effect on sharing 
information and can lead to ineffective or none existent intelligence sharing   
E. CHAPTER-BY-CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Before delving into the three case studies presented in this thesis, it must first be 
stated that the case studies chosen were done so because of their impact on future 
counterproliferation activities and availability of information. There are several cases, 
some more appropriate, that could have been chosen but to do so would have raised the 
level of classification for this thesis. Moreover, it would be contradictory to write a thesis 
that stresses open intelligence sharing with foreign partners and then not be able to share 
it with that same constituency. Another point of clarification is that this thesis was not 
designed to focus on how to prevent future horrific scenarios; rather it was designed to 
hopefully bring about a supportive rationale as to the effectiveness of intelligence sharing 
in order to reduce the likelihood of unimaginable events. 
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That said, the cases presented in this thesis will look at the legal, political, and 
intelligence sharing challenges encountered during their specific activity. The focus of 
these cases will be on the impacts intelligence sharing had or did not have on the case 
outcome. Specifically, these cases will try to illustrate and either confirm or refute the 
hypothesis that intelligence sharing can have a substantial impact on counterproliferation 
operations. 
Chapters II through IV of this thesis will be devoted to case studies on how 
intelligence has impacted counterproliferation operations. Specifically, Chapter II will be 
a study on a successful interdiction of WMD technology en route to Libya due to good 
intelligence sharing. In this case study, the German-flagged ship BBC China was stopped 
en route to Libya with a shipment of centrifuge parts for Moammar Gadhafi’s covert 
nuclear-arms program.40 Sources tipped off the United States of this shipment and with 
support from Italy and Germany the ship was diverted to Italy for inspection. While 
aboard inspectors found containers of uranium enrichment equipment.41 This interdiction 
operation not only led to Libya ceasing its nuclear weapons program but also aided in 
uncovering a covert nuclear supplier network headed by Pakistan’s AQ Khan.  
In contrast, Chapter III will be a case study on the So San incident in 2002. In this 
case, the United States received intelligence that a North Korean ship by the name of So 
San was carrying SCUD missiles and a rocket fuel additive from North Korea to Yemen 
possibly destined for Libya, Syria, or Iran.42 The ship was tracked while in the Arabian 
Peninsula until it approached the coast of Yemen. There the United States asked for some 
help from Spain to stop the ship and inspect the cargo. After some persuasion the So San 
was inspected and 15 SCUD missiles were found aboard.43 Following some diplomatic 
activity, the Yemen government admitted it was the receiver of the missiles and requested 
their release with an understanding that they would not resell the missiles and they would 
                                                 
40 Winner, 137–138. 
41 Ibid.  
42 Ibid., 131. 
43 Ibid. 
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provide support to the United States’ counter-terrorism efforts.44 This case is an example 
of where good intelligence did not equal a successful interdiction operation of WMD 
delivery systems. More importantly, the same SCUD missiles found aboard the So San 
were later discovered in Libya.45 
Similar to the So San incident is the issue of the events leading up to Operation 
Iraqi Freedom. Chapter IV will focus on this controversial issue of intelligence failure by 
the United States. Moreover, it will focus on why the U.S. intelligence community chose 
to ignore the intelligence offered by the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) 
inspectors, failed to confirm or validate their intelligence with allies, and took a unilateral 
approach with polititicized intelligence to go to war with Iraq. The outcome to this issue 
is that, after the invasion, the supposed “1.4 tons of VX nerve agent, 20,000 chemical 
capable artillery shells, 25,000 liters of anthrax, 12-20 SCUD missiles, and mobile 
laboratories” were never found46 and the United States has found itself in an unpopular 
war with limited support and its credibility questioned. This failure has also had some 
impact on potential future conflicts, namely with Iran over their alleged WMD program. 
Chapter V will review of the cases drawing on lessons learned from both their 
successes and failures. This chapter will then conclude with recommendations to improve 
intelligence sharing as a means to increase the effectiveness of counterproliferation 
efforts. In sum, the overall goal of this thesis is to determine the impact intelligence 
sharing can have on counterproliferation operations. By showing that intelligence sharing 
has a positive effect, this thesis will suggest that by increasing the amount and quality of 
intelligence shared with U.S. allies we can increase the effectiveness of counter WMD 
proliferation efforts.  
 
                                                 
44 Winner, 131. 
45 Tito Drago. "U.S. Spain Caught in Libya Missile Mix-up." Asia Times Online (December 12, 2003) 
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46 Paul Reynolds, “Can we trust the intelligence services?,” BBC News (April 24, 2003) 
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II. SO SAN (2002) 
This chapter focuses on the interdiction of the So San, a North Korean vessel 
found carrying SCUD missiles and rocket fuel additives from its port in North Korea with 
the nominal destination of Yemen but possibly destined for Libya, Syria, or Iran.47 This 
incident illustrates that no matter how much intelligence is gathered and shared, it still 
might not prevent WMD material and delivery systems from reaching states of concern. 
For example, the So San was still allowed to continue with its delivery even after the 
interdiction was publicized. Moreover, those same SCUD missiles were later found in 
Libya.48 Yet, was the result of the So San interdiction an intelligence sharing failure or 
due to other problems? This chapter will examine the extent of the intelligence sharing 
efforts; some of the legal and political challenges encountered; and the impacts the So 
San had on shaping future counterproliferation efforts.  
A. BACKGROUND  
Events leading up to this incident began on 13 November 2002 when the So San 
left its North Korean port for Yemen under the name Nam Po and flying the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) flag. While en route, the Nam Po docked in 
Singapore for eight hours in order to re-supply. While there, the So San was again 
renamed the Phnom Penh [hereafter referred to as So San in order to avoid confusion]. 
Additionally, the So San lowered its DPRK flag and instead raised the Cambodian flag. 
This abnormal activity aroused suspicion among U.S. intelligence agencies that began 
tracking the So San with U.S. warships and satellites as it made its way to Yemen.  
The crew of the So San, realizing they were being shadowed, began to veer on 
and off course elevating suspicion. On 5 December, U.S. intelligence agencies relayed 
their So San intelligence to Spain stating that, based on satellite imagery analysis, the So 
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San appeared to be carrying WMD technology and related materials.49 The following 
day, Rear Admiral Juan Moreno of the Spanish Navy and Commander of Task Force 50 
(CTF 50) ordered the Spanish frigate, Navarra, and an oiler, Patino, to shadow the So 
San and intercept if necessary.50 The Navarra and Patino, which were operating 
approximately 600 miles off the Yemeni coast patrolling the Arabian Sea in order to 
interdict Al Qaeda militants attempting to enter the Horn of Africa,51 changed course and 
headed for the Gulf of Aden. The captain and crew of the Navarra indicated that the 
bizarre activity was continuing and that they were going to intercept.  
On 9 December, the Navarra and Patino intercepted the So San in the Indian 
Ocean approximately 350 nautical miles from Socotra Island.52 The captain of the 
Navarra notified the captain of the So San of their intention to board in accordance with 
Articles 92 and 110 in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS).53 Yet, the captain of the So San refused. After two hours of trying to 
convince the So San to let them board, the Navarra fired warning shots across the So 
San’s bow.54 Still, the captain refused to slow or change course so the Spanish could 
board. The Navarra ordered its snipers to shoot the cables attached to the cargo-handling 
mast so Spanish Special Operations Forces (SOF) could rappel onto the target vessel via 
helicopter. Once aboard the So San, the SOF team detained the crew and brought the ship 
to a halt so that their second team could board as well.  
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Once the crew of 20 was under guard, Spanish Navy and Marines conducted a 
detailed inspection of the cargo based on the ship’s manifests. Upon first glance they 
noticed legal problems with the ship’s registry and that the name of the boat, covering the 
original name So San, was freshly painted. There was also a discrepancy between the 
ship’s manifest and the course the So San was traveling. In particular, the manifest stated 
that it was destined for Djibouti but its course was set for Yemen.55 Likewise, the ship’s 
manifest only showed cement but, hidden beneath pallets of cement bags, the Spanish 
forces found un-manifested containers. Before inspecting the containers themselves, the 
Spanish crew notified the U.S. Navy SEALS and requested that they come aboard with 
their explosive ordnance demolition personnel in order to continue the inspection. Once 
aboard, the U.S. Navy unit found 15 complete SCUD missiles, 15 warheads, parts for 
eight more, and capsules of rocket fuel as well as missile fuel oxidizers and 23 tanks of 
nitric acid.56 On 11 December, the So San’s cargo and crew were turned over to the 
United States to handle. 
At first, the United States and the Spanish Navy were proud to have been a part of 
such a historical event where multi-national cooperation ultimately led to the prevention 
of WMD delivery systems falling into the wrong hands. Yet, that sense of pride was short 
lived.  Following the incident, U.S. Vice-President Cheney received a telephone call from 
Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh stating that the intercepted missiles were legally 
purchased from North Korea by Yemen as a means of replacing decrepit defense 
systems.57 Furthermore, the United States had no legal basis for detaining the ship or 
impounding the cargo. The Yemeni government, which had earlier promised that it would 
no longer purchase missiles from North Korea, indicated that this purchase was done long 
before that promise was ever made with the United States. Likewise, in order for the 
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interception to be legal the United States would have to have the consent of either North 
Korea or Yemen. Therefore, the U.S. reluctantly allowed the So San and its shipment of 
SCUDs and fuel pods to continue their delivery.  
In exchange for letting the shipment proceed, the Yemen government promised to 
continue providing support for the United States’ counter-terrorism efforts and assured 
the United States that they would not resell the missiles.58 Releasing the So San was seen 
as a blow to U.S. – Spanish relations because the U.S. decision seemed to have nullified 
the political and personal risks Spanish soldiers took in interdicting the ship. However, 
the United States decided that it was more important to preserve support for the Global 
War on Terror than it would be to deprive a small number of missiles for defense in a 
country that posed no threat to the United States. Although the United States cited 
international law as a reason for not holding the So San, most observers believe that 
“Yemen’s importance to the U.S. build-up of forces in preparation for war, not 
international law, was the trump card in the U.S. decision to release the missiles.”59 
Either way, the United States’ and Spain’s biggest fear, that these weapons might fall into 
the hands of terrorists or a regime, remained even after Yemen promised that it would not 
resell the missiles. These concerns were justified when U.S. intelligence determined later 
that SCUD missiles discovered in Libya were the same weapons found on the So San.60  
Although the interdiction of the So San did not stop the missiles from reaching 
their final destination, the incident had a cascading effect on shaping future 
counterproliferation actions. First and foremost, it led to the creation of the Proliferation 
Security Initiative (PSI). More importantly, it reshaped how the United States interprets 
the UNCLOS in terms of conducting interdiction operations at sea and how it operates 
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with other countries. Some of these effects can be understood by looking at the extent of 
intelligence sharing conducted between the United States and the states involved with the 
incident.  
B. EXTENT OF INTELLIGENCE SHARING 
Intelligence gathering efforts on the So San didn’t actually begin until mid-
November 2002 due to the United States focus on disarming Iraq. Yet, some members of 
the U.S. intelligence community still felt that it was pertinent to keep watch on North 
Korea. Given the decade long political battle between the U.S. and North Korea with 
regards to nuclear proliferation and the fact that North Korea has been economically 
challenged due to U.S. imposed sanctions, members of the intelligence community 
believed that North Korea might try to improve its economic condition by selling its 
missiles and/or technology. In 2002, the U.S. intelligence community gathered evidence 
showing that money transfers equating to approximately $41 million took place between 
Yemen and North Korea, indicating that some sort of high value material transaction 
would soon follow.61  The theory was confirmed as U.S. satellites provided evidence of 
SCUDs (B and C variants) as well as other unidentified containers believed to be carrying 
some sort of chemical or fuel being loaded clandestinely onto the So San. According to 
the New York Times, the U.S. National Security Agency “spotted the movement of 15 
Scud missiles and 85 drums of chemicals from a factory in NK to its secret loading 
aboard the freighter So San.”62 
Fearing that these missile systems were destined for some country(s) or 
organization(s) that may possess ill will toward the United States and its efforts in Iraq, 
the United States began gathering information to determine the destination of the So San. 
Although the United States had not pinpointed the recipient of the missile systems, the 
information collected provided the route the So San would be traveling. The United 
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States, in its efforts to act multilaterally rather than unilaterally, notified South Korea and 
Japan of their discovery. Additionally, the United States contacted Yemeni President 
Saleh asking if Yemen had recently purchased missiles from North Korea. Though 
Yemen had purchased missiles and missile technology from North Korea in the past, 
President Saleh replied that Yemen had made no such purchase since their promise to the 
United States to cease all transactions with North Korea. 
As the United States continued to track the So San around the world to the 
Arabian Sea it noticed that the So San had changed its name and flag at least twice since 
it left North Korea. Likewise, its movements seemed to be erratic as they veered back and 
forth rather than sailing straight. As the So San continued its trek to Yemen, the United 
States contacted the Spanish government requesting support on the tracking and 
interdiction of the So San.  After the United States shared all the intelligence gathered on 
the ship and its possible cargo, the Spanish Ministry of Defense contacted its ships 
patrolling in that same area.  
The Spanish Navy and Air Force identified the So San and began tracking its 
movement by air and sea. After tracking the So San for a few miles, Spanish Rear 
Admiral Moreno sent two of his ships to interdict. After getting its personnel on board, 
the Spanish Navy conducted a thorough investigation. The results of the investigation 
were relayed and later confirmed by the United States Navy and Yemen was once again 
questioned as to its role in this shipment. Yemeni President Saleh attested to the fact that 
the missiles were indeed theirs and that the purchase was completed long before the 
United States had asked Yemen to forgo purchasing North Korean goods.  
Even though Yemen’s “lapse in memory” seems somewhat convenient with 
regards to purchasing the missiles, the United States, to Spain’s dismay, allowed the 
shipment to pass. This particular interdiction case is interesting because of the extent and 
timeliness of the intelligence shared to other countries. However, it is also a disheartening 
case considering that the missiles, purchased from a country labeled as a member of the 
“Axis of Evil” by the Bush administration, were still allowed to travel to a country having 
unsettled relations with the United States. The next section discusses some of the political 
and legal challenges that arose in this interdiction case. 
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C. CHALLENGES 
When conducting interdiction operations there are several challenges states must 
overcome in order to ensure a successful mission. In the case of the So San the mission 
was riddled with several legal and political challenges. For example, how does a state 
with presumably no legal authority interdict a foreign ship and investigate and, if 
necessary, seize its cargo? Moreover, how will this operation be perceived by other states 
within the international community? Does the perception caused by this type of 
interdiction affect how future information is received and shared? Did the outcome of the 
So San negatively affect future international relations between the United States and 
others, such as Spain? This section will look at three challenges encountered: the legality 
of the interdiction, potential political blowback of the interdiction based on perceptions, 
and the lack of transparency among all involved.  
Legal debates concerning this incident rest on two pillars: the legality of the 
interdiction itself and the legality of detaining or seizing questionable cargo. The legality 
of conducting an “at sea” interdiction rests primarily with the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In 1956, the UNCLOS was created as a means to 
protect fish stocks and enforce pollution control. Since then UNCLOS has been signed 
and ratified by more than 140 different nations and now codifies navigational rights, and 
defines certain freedoms as well as maritime zones.63 Although not all states have signed 
or ratified the UNCLOS, many still respect its mandates and provisions as customary 
law. For example, the United States, as with several other states including North Korea, 
has signed but not ratified the convention. Yet, these states still deem it customary 
international law and generally adhere to the mandates set forth by it.  
In the case of the So San, its interdiction by Spanish and later U.S. troops is 
considered legal according to the UNCLOS. Specifically, Article 110 of the UNCLOS 
states:  
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 …a ship may be forcibly boarded on the high seas if it is reasonably 
suspected of engaging in piracy or the slave trade; lacks a flag (i.e., a 
single country of registration); or is broadcasting in an unauthorized 
manner toward, or is registered in, the state that wishes to board.64 
Thus, since the So San did not properly display its state name or flag and had 
changed flags in transit, it was deemed “stateless” and according to UNCLOS codes 
“interdictable”. Moreover, the actions of the So San when the Spanish attempted to 
interdict added to the justification of steps taken by the Spanish navy.   
However, the actions by the United States in the detention of the SCUD missiles 
were deemed illegal. This illegality is based on the fact that neither North Korea nor 
Yemen is party to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Furthermore, 
carrying missiles or any type of arms is permissible on the high seas as long as it does not 
violate any other treaty that may ban transport by the state(s) carrying the goods. 
Considering that North Korea is economically dependent on continuing to aid foreign 
state missile programs due to U.S. imposed sanctions, it was not only legal for them to 
transport and sell missiles to Yemen, it would be deemed criminal if the United States did 
not allow it.  
Nonetheless, if the United States wanted to push the legality of the issue and as a 
way to push its counterproliferation agenda, sending a message to all would-be-
proliferators, it could do so in the future. Although neither North Korea nor Yemen is 
party to the MTCR, Yemen still breached a legally-binding promise to not import North 
Korean missiles. In point of fact the Yemeni letter, signed by the Yemeni President Saleh 
in July 2001 and delivered to the U.S. ambassador in Yemen, stated it was “neither the 
policy nor the practice of the government of Yemen to import SCUD missiles from North 
Korea.”65 More to the point, the United States contacted the Cambodian government and 
boarded the So San with its permission. Had the United States wanted to seize the cargo  
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as well they would have only had to ask the Cambodian government for its permission 
since, according to the flag flown and the registry used, the So San ostensibly was 
Cambodia’s legal responsibility.  
A weaker legal argument that the United States could have used is “anticipatory 
self defense”. Article 51 of the United Nations Charter allows states to take action in self-
defense. Given that the United States is waging a war on terrorism, preventing the 
possible delivery of WMD-related materials or technology could be deemed legal in the 
spirit of the U.N. article. In particular, the United States could have argued that it was 
feared SCUD missiles aboard were destined for terrorists. However, by applying this 
argument, the United States would be setting a precedent that would allow for the 
interdiction of any ship at anytime. Moreover, conducting preemptive actions in 
anticipatory self-defense may lower risks associated with military intervention but it does 
so by raising political risks. For example, by confiscating Yemen’s missiles, the United 
States could have damaged its relations with Yemen, a state that has not only sustained 
casualties while supporting U.S. efforts in fighting Al Qaeda but also allowed U.S. air 
strikes within its borders.66 
Perception is a powerful instrument in terms of shaping political actions and we 
do not always get to choose our allies. The So San interdiction had a detrimental effect on 
public perception of U.S. policy as well as relations between the United States, Yemen 
and North Korea. Moreover, it sent mixed signals to the rest of the international 
community as to what was important to the United States. For example, days before the 
interdiction of the So San, U.S. President Bush announced a new strategy to fight the 
spread of WMD, stressing the importance of interdiction and information sharing with 
allies as a means of combating proliferators. Yet, the So San demonstrated the exact 
opposite. The United States allowed missiles to be delivered from a state often referred to 
as part of the “Axis of Evil” to a country with questionable relations with the United 
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States. Why? Given that U.S. economic sanctions on North Korea has forced them to sell 
missiles, could this be seen as another attack by the United States on North Korea? The 
overall challenge of the decision to interdict or not rested on the United States deciding 
which is more important, counterproliferation or counterterrorism, and what political 
blowback would ensue from that decision.  
Another challenge was trying to determine why this shipment occured in the first 
place and what was its final destination? Were the missiles themselves intended for 
Yemen’s military, a third country, or some terrorist organization?67 All understood why 
North Korea was selling the missiles as it had been selling missiles to Pakistan, Syria, 
and Iran for decades. Yet, in the case of the So San, North Korea covertly loaded the 
missiles, filed an improper manifest stating that the cargo was headed for Djibouti, and 
told the Captain of the So San to provide false statements if questioned about it. Why all 
this secrecy if the transaction was legitimate? More importantly, why did Yemen lie 
about the transaction when confronted by the United States?  
In November 2002, the United States knew that Yemen purchased the missiles 
after they discovered $41 million dollars were transferred from Yemen to North Korea. 
This was later confirmed by intelligence sources that monitored communications between 
the So San and the Yemeni government. The United States questioned Yemen asking if 
they “were still living up to [the] 2001 pledge to not buy missiles from North Korea”68 
and still Yemeni President Saleh adamantly protested that the missiles were not theirs. 
Yet, all the evidence pointed to Yemen being the recipient of the missile systems. This 
left the United States in a position of having to decide whether maintaining an ally in the 
global war on terrorism or preventing the delivery of missile systems which could fall in 
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the hands of possible terrorist organizations was more important. To a greater extent, 
what would be the impact of making such a decision? The following section will cover 
the impact the interdiction had on the legality of “at sea” interdictions, political 
perceptions, and the lack of transparency by all involved.  
D. IMPACT  
The actual “at sea” interdiction of the So San did not have a major impact on the 
legality of conducting interdiction operations. It did, however, demonstrate that the 
United States recognizes the legal parameters of the UNCLOS and more importantly, was 
willing to abide by customary international law.69 In addition, it was the genesis of the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The PSI is an initiative designed to prevent the 
proliferation and/or shipment of WMD delivery systems and related materials via air or 
sea. It is based on a “non-binding ‘Statement of Interdiction Principles’ released on 4 
September 2003, including measures for halting that transfer of nuclear, biological and 
chemical weapons and delivery systems to ‘states and non-state actors of proliferation 
concern.”70 This initiative uses international and customary laws to its advantage by 
looking for loopholes or a “broken tail light”71 on vessels suspected of carrying WMD 
delivery systems and/or materials. It then uses these “loopholes” as a means to interdict 
and inspect possible transporters of WMD. Likewise, the PSI is willing to use the 
anticipatory self-defense argument to legitimize actions if truly required, yet try to 
abstain because of the precedent it may set.  
Yet, the interdiction of the So San was not trumpeted as a great success as some 
would think. The lack of transparency on the part of all involved sent conflicting 
messages to the world. Some European critics even stated that “the Americans screwed 
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up” when it came to intelligence efforts.72 In particular, the announcement of the So 
San’s release truly irritated the Spanish government. It had meant that it had needlessly 
risked its soldiers’ lives in an operation that did not yield any results.73 Moreover, it 
signaled to the rest of the world to go ahead and “go out on a limb for America [and] then 
watch [them] saw the limb off behind you.”74 Yet, if the United States had let the Spanish 
government know the reason for the So San’s release and why it was occurring before the 
public announcement, or had actually consulted with its ally about what follow on actions 
to take, then a lot of this dissatisfaction with the United States could have been avoided.  
In a similar argument, the So San affair was “a real blow to U.S. credibility and 
U.S. nonproliferation policy… How do you say it’s OK for Yemen but not for Iran?”75 
Moreover, it is indicative of the United States’ interdiction strategy “failing its first 
test.”76 Then again, no matter the impact, the United States was put in a predicament 
where it had to consider which was more important: counterproliferation or 
counterterrorism.   
E. LESSONS LEARNED 
The So San incident was riddled with political and legal challenges that 
subsequently impacted future counterproliferation operations. In particular, it provided 
lessons that could be learned in order to benefit future activities like the PSI. Likewise, 
although it has been argued that this incident merely demonstrated that the United States 
has “shifted [its] emphasis from eliminating weapons to eliminating regimes,”77 one 
could posit that the United States politically used this incident to send a signal to would-
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be proliferators, such as North Korea, that the United States is not only set to prevent the 
spread of WMD but it can and will do so in accordance with customary international law 
and while preparing for war. Moreover, this incident can be seen as the beginning of a 
new international norm. In essence, although the United States cannot prevent states from 
developing their own nuclear program, it can make it difficult for them to obtain the 
technology and related materials covertly. In essence, if you pursue – you will be caught. 
Similarly, there are legal lessons to be learned from the So San interdiction. In 
particular, the incident clearly articulated the need for tighter export control measures as a 
means of deterring proliferation on the high seas. The United States has taken steps to 
continue its part in ratifying this issue by expanding its membership in the 2002 
Container Security Initiative (CSI). This initiative, a critical component of international 
trade, tries to deter proliferators from shipping WMD related technology via cargo 
containers without unnecessarily detaining legal cargo. CSI’s real growth occurred in 
2004 after bilateral agreements were signed between the European Union and the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security. Moreover, the introduction of the Mobile Vehicle and 
Cargo Inspection System (MVACIS) and other technological breakthroughs has 
continued to increase membership. Even though the call for increased participation in the 
CSI is not due to the So San issue, the lesson to be learned from this event is that by 
increasing intelligence sharing efforts with members of the CSI in the future, the U.S. 
could legally detain questionable cargo without going through the political quagmire as it 
did with the So San. 
The case also demonstrated the need for better transparency between states that 
either have bilateral agreements or are party to a treaty. For example, had there been 
better transparency (i.e., information sharing) between the United States and Yemen then 
it would have alleviated some of the political fallout (e.g., embarrassment of the United 
States) due to the release of the So San and its cargo. However, the decision to hand back 
the cargo could have been strategically chosen based on the actionable intelligence 
available. Therefore, the lack of transparency did not negatively impact the decision, 
rather it added to the decision. In essence, it could be posited that the United States used 
the interdiction as a means of catching Yemen with their hands in the proverbial cookie 
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jar allowing the United States to secure another ally in its War on Terror; demonstrating 
to North Korea that the United States can interdict their ships; all while making a political 
statement that the United States is not above customary international law. 
In sum, the So San incident demonstrates the impact intelligence sharing has 
between certain allies. For example, the intelligence shared between U.S. and Spanish 
militaries leading up to the interdiction was superb. However, the United States did not 
continue sharing information with Spain following the actual interdiction. The United 
States failure to continue its consultation with the Spanish government and Spanish 
forces aboard the So San damaged future U.S.- Spanish relations as well the willingness 
of U.S. allies to support future counterproliferation actions.  
Similarly, the intelligence sharing between U.S. and Yemen governments was 
questionable, at best. It showed that the act of sharing information and intelligence had 
only a minor impact on counterproliferation operations. In this case, the SCUD missiles 
were still delivered and more to the point, later discovered in Libya. Overall, the So San 
is an excellent case study of intelligence sharing success between the United States and 
selective allies, but only to a point. Furthermore, it was a partial success that was 
ultimately and publicly painted as a political debacle. 
Therefore, the major lesson to be learned from this case is that, although it has 
been viewed as a failure by some, the risks the United States took by sharing information 
with its allies led to benefits that outweighed the costs. To illustrate, the United States not 
only demonstrated that it had the capability to interdict but also gained an ally in their 
war on terror. Additionally, this case illustrates that the intelligence sharing barriers 
encountered were behavioral on the part of North Korea and Yemen (essentially their 
mistrust of the United States) and a political barrier between Yemen and the United 
States. 
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III. BBC CHINA (2003) 
This chapter will focus on the case of the BBC China, which involves the 
interdiction of a German-flagged ship stopped en route to Libya while carrying a 
shipment of centrifuge parts for Moammar Qaddafi’s covert nuclear-arms program.78 On 
the face of it, this incident illustrates the efficiency of bilateral agreements as well as the 
value of extensive intelligence gathering and sharing among allies in order to conduct 
effective counterproliferation operations. Most dramatically, following the publicized 
interdiction, Libya not only renounced its nuclear weapons program and joined efforts to 
combat terrorism but the infamous and deceptive network of A.Q. Khan collapsed. This 
chapter will examine the extent of the intelligence sharing efforts; some of the legal and 
political challenges encountered; and address the impacts the BBC China had on shaping 
future counterproliferation efforts in an attempt to ascertain impact of information 
sharing on this counterproliferation operation. 
A. BACKGROUND  
Events leading up to the BBC China interdiction in 2003 began as early as April 
2000 when U.S. intelligence learned that A.Q. Khan, a known nuclear black marketer, 
was supplying uranium enrichment equipment to a Middle Eastern customer thought to 
be Libya. In 2001 and 2002, Khan delivered warhead plans to Libya and was prepared to 
make purchases for Libya’s nuclear weapons program. In early 2003, intelligence 
officials learned of a shipment of centrifuge parts scheduled to leave Malaysia aboard a 
cargo vessel destined for Dubai in the United Arab Emirates. In August 2003, the parts 
were loaded into five shipping containers and marked as “used machine parts” produced 
by Scomi Precision Engineering (SCOPE) and sent from B.S.A. Tahir, a known associate 
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of A.Q. Khan.79 The containers were then loaded onto the Malaysian flagged vessel, 
which set course through the Straits of Malacca towards Dubai. 
A month later, the cargo vessel docked in Dubai and its cargo was loaded onto the 
German cargo ship, BBC China. The captain of the BBC China received the cargo, 
unaware of what it the containers actually contained. In October 2003 the BBC China left 
Dubai for Libya. Two days before reaching port, the captain of the BBC China received 
orders to divert the ship to a port in Taranto, Italy, and by 4 October 2003 the BBC China 
pulled into the berthing area.  
While the ship was moored, U.S. investigators explained the cause for the 
diversion and requested permission to board to conduct their investigations. The 
investigation revealed several high quality aluminum parts stored in protective wooden 










Significantly, each part uncovered is an essential component in the construction of 
centrifuges, a device that could be used for enriching weapons-grade uranium. According 
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Description  Part Numbers Total 
Casing     4 2,208 
Molecular Pump  5 2,208 
Top spacer  6 608 
Positioner 8 10,549 
Top end 9 1,680 
Crash Ring  12 2,208 
Stationary Tube  59 1,056 
Clamp holder  73 400 
Flange  77 4,525 
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to the director of the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) at the time, “the 
equipment [found] indicated that Libya was at an ‘early stage’ of its weapon program.”81  
Following the initial inspection, the five containers were off-loaded and turned 
over to the United States for further investigations. The ship and its remaining cargo were 
then released under their own cognizance to continue delivery. Libya was confronted 
with news of the interdiction and the findings and was again asked to renounce their 
nuclear weapons program. After months of further investigations and diplomatic talks 
between Libya, the United States, and the United Kingdom, Libya agreed, granting U.S. 
and U.K. inspectors access.  Once in country, the inspectors uncovered several 
documents and artifacts regarding Libya’s nuclear and chemical weapons program. By 
December 2003 Libya agreed to permanently dismantle its entire WMD program.  
Although it is contested whether the publicized interdiction was the sole reason 
for Libya’s disarmament or if it was the “straw that broke the camel’s back”82, the 
interdiction of the BBC China and events that followed had a global effect on shaping 
future counterproliferation actions. In fact, it has been posited the interdiction prevented 
Libya from becoming a nuclear state and it became a beacon on the effectiveness of the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).  More importantly, it helped bring a successful end 
to a three decade investigation against one of the largest international nuclear smuggling 
networks, headed by the “father of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons,” Abdul Qadeer Khan.83 
The following section covers the extent of intelligence sharing between states that led to 
an effective interdiction operation. 
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B. EXTENT OF INTELLIGENCE SHARING 
The interdiction of the BBC China played a role in ending Libya’s nuclear 
program and bringing about the fall of A.Q. Khan’s nuclear black market network. Yet, 
credit for the interdiction itself truly lies in the magnitude of multilateral intelligence 
sharing and strong bilateral ties between the states involved. More importantly, the 
networking between U.S. and U.K. intelligence activities was crucial to the entire event 
succeeding. To fully understand the significance of intelligence sharing between these 
two states, it is best to start at the beginning of the information collection efforts. 
Intelligence collection activities actually began in the 1980s with U.S. 
investigators receiving hints that Khan was willing to sell sensitive nuclear information 
and equipment to non-nuclear states such as Iran, Libya, and North Korea.84 In 1987 
Pakistani investigators found nuclear weapon blueprints with handwritten notes wrapped 
in bags inside an Islamabad dry cleaner that was believed to be a front for A.Q. Khan.85 
During that same year Khan was discovered over-ordering centrifuge parts from his job 
as a major subcontractor for Urenco, a British-Dutch-German consortium whose 
specialty was designing advanced centrifuges for nuclear power plants.86 Coincidentally, 
during that same period Iran’s centrifuge construction efforts began to flourish. Yet, these 
coincidences were not enough to legally and effectively break the network. 
Likewise, while Khan worked for Urenco, U.S. and U.K intelligence agencies 
noticed that Khan began taking frequent trips, specifically visiting 18 countries in order 
to develop key relations. Intelligence officials continued to follow Khan, recording 
conversations in hopes of finding something to break this potential network. For example, 
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one such relationship discovered was with Sri Lankan businessman, B.S.A. Tahir.87 What 
investigators found was that B.S.A. Tahir had established “front” companies for Khan to 
sell the over-ordered centrifuge parts.  
In 1975, investigators learned that Khan had resigned from Urenco and 
immediately went to work for the Pakistani government as lead scientist in their nuclear 
weapons program. While working for the government, Khan requested and was 
subsequently granted full autonomy with an unlimited budget and no oversight.88 It was 
during this time that intelligence collection efforts proved especially challenging when 
trying to penetrate Pakistan’s close hold on Khan. However, in 1999, following a military 
coup in Pakistan, Khan was ordered by the new governing authority to disclose all 
records. Khan refused and was asked to resign.   
Not surprisingly, it was easy for Khan to find new work with non-nuclear states, 
like Libya, who wanted nuclear weapons and needed logistical and technical support to 
get their programs running.89 This change of events opened the door for U.S. and U.K. 
intelligence activities as they restarted investigations into Khan’s activities. Khan began 
rekindling his connections with South Africa and Malaysia in order to restore his former 
operations. In 2000, CIA and MI6 agents learned that it was probable Khan would be 
supplying uranium enrichment equipment to Libya.90 Yet, there was nothing to confirm 
the allegations. For the next two years the U.S. NSC and CIA and British MI6 continued 
their collection efforts in hopes of finding something that would allow them to effectively 
end Khan’s network.  
By 2002, intelligence finally confirmed Khan’s role in Libya’s secret nuclear 
weapons program and British and U.S. officials needed to act quickly. The British Joint 
Intelligence Committee (JIC) was also becoming particularly concerned with Libya’s 
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growing nuclear capability and the extent of A.Q. Khan’s network.91 The saving grace 
came as CIA informant, Urs Tinner, who worked at SCOPE, told CIA and MI6 officials 
about a shipment of centrifuge parts being shipped to Libya.92 This information plus what 
MI6 agents had learned from Colonel Gadafi’s son, who was studying in London, 
provided British and American forces enough material to legally conduct a 
counterproliferation operation.  
Tinner, who supervised the production and delivery of the parts, told U.S. agents 
where the shipment was being loaded. In late August 2003 U.S. spy satellites began to 
track the shipment as it left the Malaysia toward Dubai.93 In Dubai, the containers were 
transferred from the Malaysian vessel onto the BBC China. As the BBC China left Dubai 
a U.S. warship shadowed the vessel while British officials notified both Germany and 
Italy of their plans to interdict. Italy and Germany, both active members of the PSI, 
agreed to the interdiction and as the vessel passed through the Suez Canal German 
officials contacted BBC Chartering and Logistics GmbH requesting the BBC China to 
dock at Taranto, Italy. 
Following the interdiction, bilateral investigations into the Khan network 
continued and after further diplomatic pressure the Libyan and Pakistani governments 
finally offered up A.Q. Khan. Likewise, Libya openly resumed talks with the United 
States and indicated it was willing to renounce its nuclear weapons program. 
Interestingly, future investigations by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
also revealed that one of the containers, overlooked during initial investigations, 
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contained Turkish produced centrifuge parts originally destined for Libya’s nuclear 
program. When confronted Libya handed the container over to the United States.94 
The extensive intelligence sharing that took place is often accredited to the U.S.-
led counterproliferation activity, PSI, which relies heavily on information sharing 
networks designed to prevent the spread of WMD technology and related materials via 
the means of air and sea interdiction. In this case, the success of the BBC China 
interdiction was made possible by effective intelligence sharing between British MI6 
agents, the CIA and NSC, the Malaysian, Pakistani, Italian and German governments, 
and other various classified sources.  
Yet, no activity or operation is without its challenges. In the case of the BBC 
China, U.S. and British intelligence officials “knew that the BBC China was actually 
carrying parts for advanced centrifuges…the problem was how to act on that 
intelligence.”95 For example, how could they proceed with interdiction plans without 
inadvertently informing members of Khan’s network or inadvertently starting a 
diplomatic incident with either Libya or Pakistan? Likewise, what were the legal and 
political challenges? The following section discusses each of these challenges in turn. 
C. CHALLENGES  
Interdiction operations are often riddled with challenges states must overcome in 
order to effectively prevent the spread of WMD. Any type of interdiction operation has 
the potential for political backlash if it fails. States not directly involved may perceive the 
action as heavily handed and not conforming to international law. For example, how was 
it possible for the United States to interdict a German-flagged vessel traveling in  
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international waters? Moreover, how do you interdict a known shipment of WMD-related 
technology with the help of multiple states without inadvertently sharing operational 
plans with other proliferators?  
There are some who suggest the interdiction was plagued with unpredictability 
and challenges. For example, the Egyptians wanted to be the ones to actually impound 
the vessel and then inspect it since the vessel was passing through the Suez Canal. Yet, 
politically, the United States felt it had too much invested with regards to ending the 
Khan network to allow someone, other than the United States or the United Kingdom, a 
chance to claim credit for the interdiction.  
Another challenge was working with German and Italian officials. For example, 
Italy proved to be somewhat reluctant to accept U.S. intelligence as a result of the 
geopolitical relations Italy had with Libya and Italy’s “rocky” relations with the United 
States, all of which occurring during the United States invasion in Iraq, a topic that will 
be delved into more in the next chapter. Although it can be argued that Germany was 
hesitant to support this particular interdiction because of questionable legality, the issues 
surrounding Germany were actually more political in nature. Sources say that Germany’s 
reluctance was due to fear of negative public and global perception. In the past Germany 
had been involved with shipping WMD-related materials and expertise to other states. 
Moreover, Khan’s network involved German scientists and components. These issues 
coupled with the fact that the BBC China was a German flagged vessel made the 
German’s decision to interdict a political quandary.96 
Even though each of these challenges is worth further scrutiny, the supporting 
evidence has been deemed classified due to political sensitivity. Additionally, to delve 
further into the evidence behind these accusations would require this paper to be 
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classified. Therefore, in order to keep this paper at an unclassified level, this section will 
only look at those challenges supported by open-source information. In particular, this 
section will look at the legality of the interdiction, the collection of actionable 
intelligence, and the fear of inadvertent intelligence sharing. 
Just as in the case of the So San, the legal debates surrounding the interdiction of 
the BBC China rest on two principles: the legality of the interdiction itself and the 
legality of seizing questionable cargo. However, unlike the case of the So San and other 
interdiction cases the actual act of interdicting the BBC China did not require looking for 
legal “loopholes” or “broken tail lights.”97 First, the United States abided by Articles 92 
and 110 of the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) by not personally 
boarding the ship but having it redirected with consent of the flag nation.98 Second, the 
United States used previously established bilateral agreements with Germany and Italy 
and interdiction principles created by the PSI as the legal framework. Therefore, the 
overall interdiction of the vessel was not legally contentious.  
Along these same lines, seizing the BBC China’s cargo was legal for two distinct 
reasons. First, the confiscated cargo was not correctly labeled on the ship’s manifest – a 
violation of both international shipping laws and UNCLOS. Second, the actual shipping 
of centrifuge parts specifically for the production of nuclear weapons is in direct violation 
of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Since Libya was a signed and ratified member of the 
NPT since 1975, it was in direct violation. The only way the detaining or seizing of these 
components could be viewed as illegal would be if the components were delivered for 
industrial use (i.e., processing petrochemicals) and labeled correctly on both the shipping 
containers and the ship’s manifest. Since neither was done, it could only be assumed the 
components were for the development of nuclear weapons. Yet, this issue of dual-use 
technology brings into line another challenge: collecting actionable intelligence. 
Before discussing actionable intelligence a distinction must be made between 
intelligence and actionable intelligence. Intelligence in its simplest form is collected, 
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processed, and analyzed information. Actionable intelligence, however, is that 
intelligence which is immediately available in order to deal with a current situation. More 
specifically, actionable intelligence is that intelligence which is specific enough to act on. 
One of the main challenges of the BBC China was collecting enough information that 
could be later produced into some form of actionable intelligence. This proved especially 
cumbersome when dealing with dual-use items.  
For example, the casings, molecular pumps, spacers, positioners, tubes, and clamp 
holders discovered on the BBC China could be used for other mechanical devices such as 
water treatment plants. According to the New Straits Times Press the parts found, “could 
easily be fitted into many industrial or home components. Without knowing the full or a 
significant portion of the total of a sub assembly, no definitive use of assignment of the 
possible device may be made.”99 Likewise, SCOPE had presumed that the parts being 
manufactured and shipped were for “petrochemical tools, water treatment, and other 
health functions.”100 
Another issue was finding enough information about the shipment, the actual 
extent of Libya’s WMD program, and more importantly, the level of A.Q. Khan’s 
involvement. Moreover, there would need to be an extraordinary level of certainty before 
taking any action with states not already involved in collection efforts. Trying to develop 
enough actionable intelligence so the event would not turn into a political debacle, as in 
the case of the So San, embarrassing the United States and its allies would prove to be a 
difficult task. For example, U.S. and U.K. intelligence officials had been working 
feverishly to collect intelligence on Khan’s network since the 1980s. Yet, the real 
breakthrough did not come until March 2003 when Colonel Gadafi’s eldest son, Seif 
Islam, approached MI6 agents in London.101 Seif Islam offered British MI6 agents 
information regarding the rumors that Libya possessed WMD and how the Khan network 
                                                 
99 Chow Kum Hor, Annie Freeda Cruez, Anna Maria, and Koh Lay Chin. "Search of Ship Led to 
Seizure of Containers Bound for Libya." New Straits Times Press (February 21, 2004) sec. Nation, 
Http://lexis-nexis.com (accessed May 2007). 
100 “Malaysia Denies Involvement in Producing Nuclear Components for Libya” AFX News Limited, 
(2004) http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed May 2007). 
101 Frantz, Los Angles Times. 
 43
factored into Libya’s programs.102 CIA and MI6 officials used this information to 
approach Libya with options to forgo its chemical and nuclear weapons programs, yet 
Libya stonewalled negotiations until after the interdiction was publicized.  
Similarly, according to Douglas Waller “the CIA has never had much luck 
penetrating the inner circles of Gadafi's government.”103 This led to the issue of trying to 
capitalize on the fact that Libya relied on foreign expertise and material for their WMD 
programs. Consequently, had the United States realized this fact, a counterproliferation 
operation could have been conducted sooner.104 Still, the information provided by Seif 
Islam, the abundance of intelligence U.S. and U.K. agents already possessed, as well as 
the shipment information provided by Urs Tinner, would prove to be enough for an 
effective counterproliferation interdiction operation. The only issue remaining was 
determining whether to proceed militarily or rely on export control measures. 
Ostensibly, one would think that export control measures are a perfect alternative 
to military action and would support international law. However, Dr. Khan had exploited 
countries, such as the ones involved, for decades particularly because of their weak 
export control laws. According to investigations by Malaysian police officials, “the 
centrifuge components seized on the BBC China showed how the network exploited 
Malaysia’s weak national export control system.”105 Dr. Khan also used complex 
transportation arrangements in order to deceive intelligence officials.106 For instance, 
“the international free zone in Dubai, through which shipments are still subject to few  
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meaningful controls, was particularly critical to the network.”107 Essentially, these weak 
export control measures and complicated shipping arrangements had complicated and 
undermined intelligence collection efforts. 
A similar challenge was conducting a thorough search on a vessel as large as the 
BBC China. Since on-board inspectors only had information about the SCOPE 
containers, one container carrying the Turkish equivalent of the same seized components 
was never confiscated. According to reports by the IAEA, the United States had released 
the BBC China prematurely and had missed one that contained several more advanced 
Turkish centrifuge parts.108 However, U.S. intelligence officials involved rebutted saying 
they “didn't miss anything…'Everything we had actionable intelligence on we found’.”109 
Subsequently, five months later Libya turned over the forgotten container to the United 
States. 
The final and most crucial challenge was trying to collect enough intelligence to 
stop both Khan and Libya without inadvertently sharing information that could forewarn 
members of Khan’s network or the Libyan government.  In particular, it was believed that 
the circulation of any information prematurely would inhibit chances of a thorough 
investigation into the Khan network.110 This fear was later confirmed when investigators 
found destroyed evidence following the leakage of information to the press regarding the 
interdiction. Consequently, these events are why the PSI believes that keeping “their 
successes secret is important.”111 Yet, even though evidence was destroyed, there was 
enough evidence to continue bilateral investigations into Khan’s network, which 
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eventually led to the end of Khan’s “nuclear Wal-mart.”112 Additionally, Libya 
eventually allowed inspectors to look at its entire nuclear and chemical weapons 
programs, although why Libya continued to buy nuclear-related materials six months 
before abandoning its entire program is a conundrum in itself. The next section covers the 
impacts the interdiction had on counterproliferation operations more in depth. 
D. IMPACT  
Parsimoniously, there are three major impacts of the BBC China interdiction: 
Libya’s abandonment of its WMD program, the eventual roll-up of A.Q. Khan’s network, 
and the call by the United States to amplify PSI activities. This section will look at each 
of the impacts and the effect it had on future of counterproliferation activities.  
The first, and often contested, impact was the renouncement of Libya’s WMD 
program. Politically, this could not have come at a better time as the United States and its 
supporting allies were at war with Iraq over the very issue of WMD. Yet, although the 
interdiction was a factor in Libya’s decision-making process, some U.S. officials believe 
that the interdiction merely had a psychological effect. In particular, some officials 
believe that the “Libyans may have been ‘hedging their bets’ by pursuing a weapons 
programme while engaged in secret talks” 113 and that once “they saw how much we 
knew about what they were doing” 114 they let inspectors into Libya. 
Others believe that Libya did not abandon its weapons program simply because of 
the BBC China but because of long, often secret, diplomatic talks between the United 
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States, the United Kingdom, and Libya.115 For example, the incident occurred just as 
Libya made a deal to dismantle their programs in return for the removal of U.S. 
sanctions.116 Still, whether it was the actual interdiction or time spent in secret diplomatic 
negotiations, the fact remains that Libya renounced its program. Moreover, the events 
prohibited Libya from continuing its work on weaponizing stockpiles of nerve and 
mustard agents as well as developing nuclear weapons.117  
Politically, Libya’s renouncement demonstrated the benefits of disbanding WMD 
programs and how continuing such programs will only bring dire consequences. It also 
illustrated how effective diplomatic talks between states could prevent a former “rogue 
state” from developing a weapon of mass murder. In the end, it led to Libya signing 
additional protocols to the NPT allowing IAEA inspectors complete access to all 
programs and facilities.118 
Additionally, the information Libya provided U.S. investigators on A.Q. Khan 
and his nuclear network led to investigators uncovering various and numerous front 
companies and production facilities. The intelligence gathered also led to the discovery of 
“hundreds of pages of engineering drawings and handwritten notes [that would] provide 
an excellent starting point for anyone trying to develop an effective atomic warhead.”119 
It also uncovered that Khan’s network exploited Malaysian facilities and ordered parts 
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proved embarrassing for states and eventually led to the Pakistani government to look for 
other possible members of Khan’s network, ostensibly to prevent it from happening 
again.120 
Another controversial impact of the BBC China is the impact the interdiction had 
on the PSI. Because of the successful interdiction operation, U.S. President Bush 
announced in 2004 the need to “expand the core group of PSI countries” from its original 
11 members.121 In addition, President Bush announced several proposals to increase the 
effectiveness of the PSI. Some of these include the expansion of PSI’s focus in order to 
address more than shipments and transfers; increased intelligence sharing activities in 
both military and law enforcement agencies both foreign and domestic; and the strict 
enforcement of export control laws.122 
These proposals by President Bush were timely and achievable. One month after 
announcing the proposals, the United Nations Security Council Resolution passed 
UNSCR 1540. This act requires “all states to criminalize proliferation to non-state actors 
and to establish, review, and maintain appropriate and effective export control 
systems.”123 Yet, was the interdiction a catalyst for the PSI or did it just happen to come 
at a time when President Bush needed talking points to promote his quest for taking 
action against WMD?  
It has been suggested, “the PSI was not essential to intercepting the Libya 
shipment”124and that the PSI was too immature for it to have been able to organize such 
an interdiction. Specifically, the interdiction took place within six months of the PSI’s 
creation. Moreover, there were no documented cases of the PSI conducting any type of 
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exercise prior to the BBC China incident. Essentially, it was a political decision to credit 
the successful interdiction of the BBC China to the PSI. Still, even though the “the PSI 
may not have been the chief driver behind”125 Libya’s renouncement or A.Q. Khan’s fall, 
it is implausible to suggest the interdiction did not play a part in how events unfolded. 
E. LESSONS LEARNED 
Although it cannot be said with certainty that the successful interdiction of the 
BBC China was due in large part to the effectiveness of the PSI, it is a brilliant example 
of how intelligence sharing among allies is an effective tool for counterproliferation 
operations. Similarly, although it is contested whether it was because of “threats from 
America” or “lengthy British and American diplomacy,” that was responsible for 
stopping the Khan network and subsequent termination of Libya’s WMD programs, it is a 
testament to the effectiveness of international cooperation.126 According to the British 
Butler Report, good intelligence and good intelligence sharing “can create its own 
positive momentum… [it] increase[s] confidence in the reliability of reporting from the 
sources… [and] often uncover[s] new leads… [the BBC China] was a major intelligence 
success.”127 
Along the same lines, sharing intelligence among allies enables policy makers to 
make sound policy recommendations. For example, “without precise intelligence, the 
entire BBC China operation might have fizzled, or have even led to an embarrassing 
international incident.”128 As former Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, 
stated, “Intelligence was the key that opened the door to Libya’s clandestine program.”129 
                                                 
125 Michael Roston. "Polishing Up the Story on the PSI." In the National Interest 3, no. 23 (June 9, 
2004), http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/Vol3Issue23/Vol3Issue23Roston.html (accessed May 
2007). This is Roston’s interpretation of President Bush’s address February 2004. President Bush never 
directly stated this. 
126 Brown, Sunday Telegraph. 
127 Committee of Privy Counselors, Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, 17–22. 
128 Kitfield, Global Security Newswire. 
129 Torrey C. Froscher, "Anticipating Nuclear Proliferation." Nonproliferation Review 13, no. 3 
(November 2006): 472 http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol13/133/133froscher.pdf (accessed May 2007). The 
quote used by Froscher was taken from a speech given by former DCI Tenet while visiting Georgetown 
University. 
 49
To conclude, although the interdiction was not legally contentious there were 
legal obstacles that had to be overcome in order for the interdiction of the BBC China to 
be a success. In particular, the BBC China incident resulted in stronger UN Security 
Council resolutions – a sign that preventing the spread of WMD is a global issue and one 
that requires integrated information sharing networks.  Likewise, overcoming the political 
hurdles of organizing a U.S. led multilateral interdiction based on bilateral intelligence 
with states that had limited relations with the United States has shown that effective 
intelligence sharing can be the catalyst to preventing the spread of WMD technology and 
related materials. Moreover, given the impact intelligence sharing had on the overall 
success of the interdiction and the subsequent impact it had on future counterproliferation 
operations, it is reasonable to conclude that intelligence sharing has a substantial impact 
on counterproliferation operations. 
Therefore, the primary lesson to be learned from this case is that, just as in the 
case of the So San, the risks the United States took by sharing information with its allies 
produced benefits that truly outweighed the costs. The United States took a huge risk of 
exposing clandestine sources and methods to gain allied support in order achieve the 
monumental event taking down the A.Q. Khan network and the subsequent 
renouncement of WMD by Libya.  Likewise, as with So San, technology was not a factor 
to intelligence sharing. However, unlike with the So San, the cultural and behavioral 
barriers between the United States, Italy, Germany, and Egypt somewhat impeded 
progress and eventually had to be overcome in order for this operation to be a success. 
Additionally, although the political barriers – such as the one that existed between the 
United States and Egypt as to who would be the one to interdict the BBC China, the 
negative perception Italy had on U.S. credibility due to the use of politicized information 
in the past, and the fact that Germany was trying to avoid be labeled as a supporter of 
WMD proliferation – protracted operations to a point where no one believed it was going 
to happen, each issue was successfully overcome. This case clearly demonstrates both 
that successful information sharing can be achieved and that it can play a vital role in 
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IV. IRAQ WMD  
Wednesday, September 12, 2001, dawned as the first full day of a world 
gone mad…Arriving at the White House, I saw Secret Service personnel 
stationed every few feet, all of them brandishing weapons. Clearly visible 
overhead were fighter aircraft patrolling the skies above the nation’s 
capital…All this weighed heavily on my mind as I walked beneath the 
awning that leads to the West Wing and saw Richard Perle exiting the 
building just as I was about to enter. Perle is one of the godfathers of the 
neoconservative movement and, at the same time, was head of the Defense 
Policy Board, an independent advisory group to the secretary of 
defense…As the doors closed behind him, we made eye contact and 
nodded. I had just reached the door myself when Perle turned to me and 
said, ‘Iraq has to pay a price for what happened yesterday. They bear 
responsibility.’…I was stunned but said nothing. Eighteen hours earlier, I 
had scanned passenger manifests from the four hijacked airplanes that 
showed beyond doubt that al Qa’ida was behind the attacks…the 
intelligence then and now, however, showed no evidence of Iraqi 
complicity. Moments later, a second thought came to me: Who was 
Richard Perle meeting with in the White House so early in the morning on 
today of all days?130 
 
No quote better suggests the political dynamics that influenced intelligence 
collection and sharing efforts before an invasion than this account by former Director of 
Central Intelligence (DCI) George Tenet. According to Tenet, the U.S. decision to invade 
Iraq was never solely based on the probability of Iraq having WMD. If this were true then 
the U.S. should have invaded North Korea years before Iraq even became an issue. The 
prospect of Iraq having WMD was, however, the one reason all members of the Bush 
Administration could agree upon in order to invade.131 It also happened to be the one 
talking point the public understood and could rally around. 
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This chapter analyzes the intelligence sharing efforts to that supported the 
portrayal of Iraq as a WMD threat. The “assumptions and inferences that guided 
analysis” coupled with the amount of flawed intelligence shared made a decision “not” to 
invade Iraq appear more costly than the alternative.132 Saddam Hussein’s deception plan 
to deter potential adversaries also aided in the United States’ involvement in the most 
costly and controversial military intervention since Vietnam, Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
This chapter will cover the extent of intelligence shared, challenges, and impacts 
intelligence sharing had not only on domestic operations but also U.S. relations with its 
allies. More importantly, it will discuss lessons that could be learned in an effort to 
ensure the U.S. does not find itself involved in another fiasco like Operation Iraqi 
Freedom based on bad intelligence. In short, this chapter will show that, although there 
was extensive intelligence being shared among allies, the political agendas of all parties 
involved led to failed counterproliferation efforts. Thus, successful intelligence sharing 
did not contribute to successful cooperation on counterproliferation.  
A. BACKGROUND  
Fear of Iraq’s WMD capabilities did not truly manifest as an imminent threat until 
after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. Following the Gulf War, the United 
States increased funding for intelligence collection and analysis with the intelligence 
community spending a majority of their efforts determining Iraq’s WMD capability and 
probability of use and giving this information to the United Nations. Information 
collected was based mostly on Iraq’s earlier use of chemical weapons during the 1980-
1988 Iraq-Iran war and against Iraq’s Kurdish population as well as human intelligence 
(HUMINT) reports. Clandestine sources, generally consisting of Iraqi defectors, revealed 
that Iraq showed interest towards pursuing nuclear and biological munitions in addition to 
their chemical arsenal. And although Iraq never used tactical or strategic WMD during 
the Gulf War, the actual scope of Iraq’s clandestine programs, discovered after the Gulf 
War, highlighted vulnerabilities in the United States’ defense plans.133 
                                                 
132 Froscher, 473. See also endnote 32 in Froscher’s article. 
133 Ellis and Kiefer, 17. 
 53
Based on initial discoveries, the U.S. ramped up bilateral and multilateral 
intelligence sharing with allies, particularly with the UN. The information found led to 
the United Nation’s Security Council passing several Security Council Resolutions 
(UNSCR) calling for several provisions and, specifically, Iraq’s unconditional surrender 
and/or destruction of all WMD. The first of these resolutions, UNSCR 687, was passed in 
April 1991 and called for the complete destruction of all WMD munitions and Iraq’s 
agreement to never “acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable 
material.”134 Since then there were sixteen other resolutions each with provisions 
requiring Iraq to cease all WMD-related activities, allow inspectors freedom to go 
anywhere to ensure compliance, and end its oppression against its own populace.135  
With the passing of each resolution Iraq would find ways to deceive inspectors, 
tamper with equipment, or flagrantly disregard provisions set forth. These violations 
continued until 2002 when the UN passed what was to become their last resolution before 
war, UNSCR 1441. This resolution, passed in November 2002, called for the “immediate 
and complete disarmament of Iraq and its prohibited weapons…full access to Iraqi 
facilities” and a final warning that Iraq “will face serious consequences as a result of its 
continued violations of its obligations.”136 Saddam reluctantly agreed to allow UN 
Special Commission (UNSCOM), later designated the UN Monitoring, Verification, and 
Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), inspectors access to all facilities. Inspectors could 
never verify whether Iraq still had WMD or not; yet, their general inclination was that 
Iraq was in compliance. However, members of the Bush administration believed that Iraq 
was still actively pursuing WMD capabilities and had simply hidden stockpiles of 
chemical and biological weapons from inspectors. 
Because of these perceptions, the United States continued pressuring the UN for 
approval to invade Iraq in order to remove Saddam Hussein from power and destroy 
Iraq’s suspected clandestine WMD facilities. Believing the United States would never 
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secure UN Security Council support, President Bush announced plans to attack Iraq 
whether or not the UN passed another resolution authorizing use of force. Following the 
announcement, U.S. and British military forces began developing Forward Operational 
Bases (FOB) in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman as well as patrolling the Gulf, Indian Ocean, 
and Arabian Sea. By the end of January 2003, there were more than 100,000 coalition 
and Special Forces ready to invade.  
On February 5, 2003, then U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell presented 
evidence based on satellite imagery and human intelligence that Iraq continued to posses 
WMD to the UN Security Council. This speech would become the United States’ last 
effort to gain support and legitimacy from UN members. After Powell gave his 
presentation, Dr. Hans Blix, then head inspector for UNMOVIC, testified that Iraq was 
adhering to the provisions outlined in UNSCR 1441 and there was no evidence to either 
confirm or deny the allegations brought forth by the United States. Dr. Blix’s testimony 
cast doubt on Powell’s and the United States never received UN approval. Yet, this 
setback did not stop President Bush and on March 17, 2003, he announced in his 
“Address to the Nation” the infamous ultimatum to Saddam, “leave within 48 hours or be 
killed.”137 Two days later U.S.-led coalition forces crossed into Iraq. In less than a month 
U.S. troops seized the capital of Iraq and by December 2003 Saddam Hussein was 
captured and placed on trial for crimes against the Iraqi people.  
Since the fall of Baghdad, U.S.-led coalition forces have been conducting 
reconstruction operations and endeavors to uncover WMD. The goal was to find 
Saddam’s hidden caches and show the world that, although the invasion was deemed 
illegal, it was necessary to bring about global peace and security. Yet, “neither during 
combat operations nor in the months immediately following…did coalition forces  
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uncover a smoking gun, proving the extensive prewar WMD allegations.”138 Moreover, 
the invasion and subsequent attempt at regime change led to a dangerous political 
situation with coalition forces stuck in the middle of a civil war. It appears that the United 
States underestimated Iraq’s WMD capabilities during the Gulf War and overestimated 
the same threat after inspectors left in 2002. However, was this overestimation due to 
poor intelligence sharing or the sharing of flawed intelligence on a multilateral level? To 
what extent did the United States share its intelligence with allies? 
B. EXTENT OF INTELLIGENCE SHARING 
Long before the creation of current intelligence sharing bureaucracies, the U.S. 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was the premier intelligence sharing agency with 
foreign services. In particular, the CIA was the lead element for collecting and analyzing 
intelligence on Iraq often working side by side with such allies as Israel’s Mossad, 
Britain’s MI5 and MI6 units, and even Pakistani Intelligence officials. For example, 
Israel’s Mossad knew a great deal about Iraq’s WMD capability during the 1970s and 
80s, and Israel conducted successful preemptive strikes destroying such facilities as 
Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981.139 Following the Gulf War, the Mossad provided much of 
the intelligence collected by the CIA.140 In August 2002, Israeli intelligence postulated 
that Iraq was actively pursuing biological weapons and would first release Anthrax 
against troops followed closely by Smallpox.141 Another example is the intelligence 
sharing between U.S. and Britain. In particular, in 1999 and then again in September 
2002, MI6 produced reports that Iraq was attempting to purchase refined uranium, 
“yellowcake,” from Niger.142  Although neither of these reports proved true – a topic that  
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will be covered more in depth later – these forms of bilateral intelligence sharing are a 
pittance in comparison to the extent of sharing done between the United States and the 
United Nations. 
The unprecedented collaboration effort between the United States and the United 
Nations was considered one of the most innovative tactics of the time.143 Generally, 
bilateral agreements were used to manage actions against potential WMD proliferators. 
However, in this case, members of the United Nations and the United States desired the 
same end state and “the potential payoff from supplying significant intelligence platforms 
and products to the [UNSCOM] inspectors outweighed the potential risks to sources and 
methods.”144  
When UN inspections began in 1991, UNSCOM investigators successfully 
uncovered several undeclared chemical weapon munitions sites based on intelligence 
provided by the U.S. and Britain. Yet inspectors were consistently being misled by Iraq. 
As a result of Iraq’s deception efforts, in 1993 the UN created the Information 
Assessment Unit (IAU), which relied heavily on support from more than forty nation’s 
intelligence agencies for collection and analysis.145 Specifically, the United States, 
United Kingdom, and Israel became the biggest providers of intelligence. 
Of all three, the United States provided the most information focusing mainly on 
human intelligence (HUMINT), measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) and 
signal intelligence (SIGINT) via electronic eavesdropping and ground-based radio 
scanners.146 Likewise, prior to 1998, information discovered by the UN inspectors was 
shared with the United States. For example, defectors from Saddam’s army shared 
intelligence on Iraq’s WMD program with UNSCOM inspectors who would then pass it 
on to the United States. One prime example was General Hussein Kamal Hassan. Hassan, 
one of Saddam Hussein’s sons-in-law and former head of Iraq’s WMD and missile 
program, provided extensive information to include the location of one of Iraq’s 
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clandestine WMD facilities.147 The U.S. confirmed the location of the facility using 
satellite imagery. Inside, inspectors found several hundred thousand pages worth of 
information regarding Iraq’s missile and WMD programs including information that led 
inspectors to believe Iraq had several hundred metric tons of the nerve agent, VX.148 
In 1998 the UN ordered its inspectors to leave Iraq after receiving reports that 
Saddam Hussein was not cooperating in full with inspection efforts. Additionally, 
although inspectors were not fully convinced of Iraq’s sincerity in abandoning WMD, 
inspectors believed that there was not enough evidence to warrant further inspections. 
Incidentally, their departure posed a significant challenge for the United States – an issue 
that will be covered later. To resume, in December 1999 information provided by 
HUMINT sources began to raise the question of Iraq’s WMD posture thus reinvigorating 
the necessity for the reinstitution of inspections.  However, Saddam refused to allow 
inspectors back in believing they were spies for the United States. In early 2002, after 
receiving assurance from Hans Blix that inspectors would not share intelligence found 
with anyone who did not need to know or spy for any government, Saddam conceded.  
Although UNMOVIC refused to continue sharing intelligence with the United 
States, the United States continued to share relevant information with inspectors. 
Clandestine satellite photos of WMD storage sites, HUMINT reports, and intercepted 
telephone messages were still passed to UNMOVIC inspectors. Yet no matter what 
intelligence was provided, nothing significant was ever found by UNMOVIC inspectors. 
More importantly, since nothing was ever found, inspectors began to question the validity 
of the intelligence presented to them. Specifically, in 2003 members of the UN Security 
began to question the intentions of the United States, Britain, and Israel. More to the 
point they began to wonder if the United States had “colonialist intentions” in mind and if 
they were purposefully politicizing the intelligence to support action.149 This suspicion of  
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the United States’ intentions was one of many challenges the United States faced with 
regards to sharing intelligence with allies. The next section covers more of these 
challenges in depth. 
C. CHALLENGES TO SHARING INTELLIGENCE 
Estimating Iraq’s WMD program essentially became a battle between what the 
intelligence claimed and what inspectors actually found. A more significant challenge is 
that once incorrect information has been shared it is almost impossible to continue doing 
so without your own intentions being called to attention. In this case, there were 
significant challenges that had to be faced. The three main challenges found were: 
multilateral sharing; faulty intelligence; and Saddam’s deception plan. Each challenge 
posited made sharing information a difficult feat – one that would inevitably lead to the 
undermining of the United States’ credibility. 
1. Sharing on a Multilateral Level 
The previous case studies referred to the challenges of bilateral and at times 
trilateral sharing when it came to counterproliferation. In this situation the U.S. chose to 
take a multilateral approach to sharing intelligence on Iraq’s WMD proliferation. Efforts 
to operate multilaterally can lead to long-winded debates, misperceptions, frustration, 
and, as posited by U.S. Vice-President Dick Cheney, “a policy of doing exactly 
nothing.”150 For example, Saddam Hussein’s allegations that UN inspectors were mere 
“puppets of U.S. interests” and their presence an attempt at covertly gathering 
intelligence caused uproar within the international community and clearly illustrate the 
complexity and sensitivity of multilateral sharing.151  
Conversely, intelligence sharing with the United Nations was the most notable, 
yet taxing, approach for the United States. In order to succeed the U.S. would have to 
overcome some of its most prevalent fears. Notably, it would have to ensure sources and 
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methods would not be compromised.152 Likewise, it would have to guard against 
fabricated information entering their analysis which could cause loss of credibility within 
the international community.153 This daunting task proved even more difficult than 
originally expected, as some states believed the United States had already decided to go 
to war with Iraq and was just using the UN to gain legitimacy and support.154 
Additionally, it was perceived the U.S. was pressuring states for information. The issue 
of having to trust the credibility of information from those already suspicious of your 
actions makes it very difficult to effectively share information multilaterally.  
2. Faulty Intelligence 
While trying to collect and disseminate information within a multilateral setting is 
a complex task, doing so with faulty intelligence is even trickier. First, using faulty 
information makes it harder for a state to validate sources and methods. Second, passing 
false information hurts the state’s credibility with others. There were three problems that 
led to faulty intelligence: misinterpretation of information, politicized intelligence by 
U.S. policymakers and allies, and an overall lack of credible sources [e.g., the infamous 
Iraqi defector codenamed Curveball].  
One reason that facts were misinterpreted was due to the challenges of collecting 
and analyzing information based on dual use technology. Just as in the case of the BBC 
China, the U.S. began investigating dual use technology based on information received 
from allies and other clandestine sources. U.S. intelligence agencies believed these 
technologies to be signs that Iraq had not completely abandoned its WMD program. In 
particular, Iraq’s clandestine purchases of aluminum tubes, magnets, high speed 
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balancing machines, machine tools, and mapping software, and the reporting of mobile 
biological weapons laboratories were all believed to be significant indicators.155 
Yet, subsequent investigations found each to have been purchased for 
conventional use. For example, Department of Energy (DOE) and IAEA investigators 
later assessed the aluminum tubes purchased were unsuitable for centrifuge rotors and 
were actually for artillery purposes.156 Likewise, the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) 
determined that the “machine tools were not capable of supporting a centrifuge program 
and that the balancing machine was intended for much heavier components than a 
centrifuge.”157 The mobile laboratories, thought to be essential for testing and producing 
biological weapons, were actually antiquated trailers designed to produce hydrogen for 
meteorological balloons.158 Similarly, the purchase of mapping software by Iraq was also 
misinterpreted. Believed to be targeting software, it was actually part of an autopilot 
software program purchased – yet, never installed – by the Iraqi military.159 Yet, were 
these items misconstrued because of poor analysis or was it politicized intelligence used 
to legitimize U.S. efforts? According to Tenet some of his senior analysts soon came 
under the perception that the issue of whether Iraq had WMD or if we “should we go to 
war” was no longer the priority for them. 160 Instead analysts were now being called in to 
                                                 
155 “Conclusion of Senate’s Iraq Report: Report on the prewar intelligence assessments,” MSNBC.com 
(2004) http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5403731/print/1/displaymode/1098/ (accessed July 2007); Report on 
Postwar Findings about Iraq's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and how they Compare with 
Prewar Assessments, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 109th Congress (Washington, DC, 2004) 
20-21; George Tenet, “Statement on the 2002 NIE on Iraq’s Continuing Programs for WMD”  (August 11, 
2003) https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/press-release-archive.html 
(accessed July 2007) 
156 “Conclusion of Senate’s Iraq Report: Report on the prewar intelligence assessments,” Report on 
Postwar Findings about Iraq's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and how they Compare with 
Prewar Assessments, 20–25. 
157 Report on Postwar Findings about Iraq's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and how they 
Compare with Prewar Assessments, 24. 
158 Report on Postwar Findings about Iraq's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and how they 
Compare with Prewar Assessments, 36; Klaus Wiendl and Rudolf Lambrecht, “German Television Cites 
Eye-Witness for Iraq’s Mobile Laboratories,” ARD Television (Munich, Germany, February 17, 2003). 
Translated by OpenSource.gov https://www.opensource.gov (accessed June 2007); Sebastian Knauer, 
German Site Claims Alleged Mobile WMD Plants Solely for ‘Agrochemicals,” Spiegel Online, Hamburg, 
Germany. Translated by OpenSource.gov https://www.opensource.gov (accessed June 2007); Tenet, 403. 
159 Report on Postwar Findings about Iraq's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and how they 
Compare with Prewar Assessments, 51. 
160 Tenet, 308. 
 61
answer “how” we could go to war and “how will we explain it to the public.”161 For 
example, the misinterpreted information was never officially cross-referenced with 
outside agencies to ensure validity – an issue that will be discussed later in this section. 
Reports by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) also found that 
members of the U.S. intelligence community were consistently looking for evidence to 
support preconceived notions. Specifically it was found that Iraq’s elaborate clandestine 
WMD program found after the Gulf War tainted policymaker’s confidence in Iraq’s 
integrity. Likewise, “prior to 1998, the IC [Intelligence Community] had become heavily 
dependent on UN information on the state of Iraq’s WMD programs” and “did not 
develop a sufficient unilateral HUMINT collection effort…to take its place.” 162 This left 
government officials unable to confirm or deny their fears (i.e., blinded). More to the 
point it forced intelligence agencies to rely on dated and often “less reliable and less 
detailed sources.”163 
The SSCI also found that the U.S. intelligence community discounted UN 
inspectors’ reports that there was no evidence of WMD, because U.S. officials believed 
inspectors were being duped by Iraq. Additionally, the SSCI found that one shared 
assumption by policymakers was that those “sources who denied the existence or 
continuation of WMD programs and stocks were either lying or not knowledgeable about 
Iraq’s programs, while those sources who reported ongoing WMD activities were seen as 
having provided valuable information.”164 In order to find supporting intelligence they 
would have to rely on defectors from Saddam’s regime who, interestingly enough, would 
openly testify in return for secure visas.165 The most infamous of HUMINT sources used 
was Curveball.  
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Curveball was a former Iraqi chemical engineer who, in 1998, found himself in a 
German refugee camp. The German Federal Intelligence Service (BND) offered 
Curveball an immigration card in return for information on Iraq. The BND began sharing 
bits and pieces of what they learned to the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); 
however, they would let neither DIA nor CIA have direct access to Curveball. By chance, 
members of the CIA were eventually able to gain access to Curveball and at first glance 
believed “there was something wrong.”166 When Curveball was given a routine 
examination the doctor noted, “the man appeared hungover” and “he expressed doubts 
about his reliability.”167 Moreover, according to his German handlers even warned 
members of the CIA that “You don’t want to see him [Curveball] because he’s crazy. 
Speaking to him would be a waste of time.”168 Incidentally, this last fact is debatable 
since the BND still deny ever saying that he was “crazy” merely that they could not 
verify his testimony and that he was a “single source.”169 
In spite of these indicators, the information Curveball provided melded with what 
members of the Bush administration believed; therefore policymakers judged his 
testimony to be trustworthy.170 More importantly, the DIA “disseminated almost 100 
foreign intelligence reports from Curveball.”171 Furthermore, the information provided 
was used in Powell's address to the UN Security Council on February 5, 2003, albeit 
against his better judgment.172 
Subsequent investigations revealed that those responsible for “handling” 
Curveball did an inefficient job. The information was sparse and it seemed that his 
“handlers” were merely passing along rather than verifying the information. Likewise, 
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the CIA agents who were told that Curveball was “crazy” and unreliable never relayed 
that to the DCI or DIA. These failures and inadequacies clearly illustrate the “dangers of 
relying on foreign intelligence.”173 Furthermore, members of the intelligence community 
knowingly excluded objective analysis from other agencies such as the Department of 
Energy.174 
Britain’s intelligence services also used sources that were unvetted, untried, or 
had never presented information with regards to Iraq’s WMD capability.175 And although 
members of MI6 emphatically reiterated that information from the sources being used 
“remains unproven,”176 the information was still relayed to U.S. intelligence agencies. 
This fact raises the question, why would Britain knowingly pass along faulty 
information? According to Robin Cook, Britain’s former foreign secretary and later critic 
of the Iraq war, “what was propelling the Prime Minister [Tony Blair] was determination 
that he would be the closest ally to George Bush and they would prove to the United 
States administration that Britain was their closest ally.”177 The collection of faulty 
information was even easier because of Saddam Hussein’s deceptive behavior.  
3. Saddam’s Deception Plan 
According to the II Republican Guard Corps Commander, Lieutenant General 
Raad Majid al-Hamdani, Saddam told his inner circle that the “better part of war was 
deceiving.”178 Saddam Hussein conducted operations based on this principle up to the 
point of the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. Prior to that Saddam frequently relied on the 
implied threat of chemical weapons to ward off Iranian attacks, maintain control over 
Shiites, and present himself as a powerful dictator not only to his own populace but to the 
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world. For example, after the Gulf War Saddam propagated the perception that the only 
reason why U.S. troops did not enter Baghdad was because of Iraq’s chemical and 
biological capabilities.179 
Saddam’s deceptive plans allowed him to stay in power and effectively rule Iraq. 
However, Saddam’s deception also led him into a risky predicament. On the one hand, 
Saddam had to show his own people that he was still in control; while, on the other hand, 
he had to show compliance to the UN demands for disarmament. He was playing a risky 
game trying to keep up a guise George Tenet parallels to the necessity of appearing as a 
“tough guy” in the bad part of town.180 
In order to keep up the deception but still show compliance, Saddam allowed UN 
inspectors into Iraq but purposefully limited their access from certain palaces and 
facilities. Likewise, Iraq would openly tell the UN that they were abiding by UN 
resolutions often giving ambiguous accounts as to how they had disposed of WMD and 
precursor stockpiles. Moreover, he would forbid weapon scientists from leaving Iraq or 
being interviewed by the UN. Saddam’s deception plan worked so well that Abd-al-
Tawab ‘Abdallah al-Mullah Huwaysh, a senior military officer who oversaw the Iraq’s 
military industry, was so convinced he began to wonder if Saddam really did control a 
secret cache of weapons.181 Furthermore, Saddam’s counter-intelligence efforts 
significantly challenged British MI6 collection operations or efforts to validate the 
credibility of sources.182 
As U.S. forces continued plans for the invasion, Saddam knew that his game of 
deception was about to come to an end. Complete openness by Saddam would be the only 
way to influence and hopefully dissuade an invasion he did not possess the forces to stop. 
In January 2003, Saddam granted full access to UN inspectors promising full 
cooperation. Yet, the U.S. had already made its mind to invade and nothing was going to 
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stop them. Knowing this, Saddam positioned his forces around Baghdad forming a 
fortress defense or what the U.S. referred to as the “Red Line”.183 This led to another 
misinterpretation by the intelligence community. Essentially, Saddam’s defensive 
strategy was seen as a trigger for the use of WMD against forces. Specifically, if troops 
were spotted approaching the “Red Line” Saddam would launch chemical and/or 
biological weapons in retaliation.184  
Overall, the failure of the intelligence community to accurately vet sources and 
analyze information mixed with preconceived notions about the Iraq threat contributed to 
the outcome seen today. Additionally, the invasion itself can be attributed to inadequate 
information sharing between the U.S. and allies. Ironically, Saddam’s efforts to deceive 
his enemies in order to remain in power ultimately resulted in him losing his dictatorship 
and his life. Tenet best summed this point by saying, “Before the war, we didn’t 
understand that he [Saddam Hussein] was bluffing; and he didn’t understand that we 
were not.”185 This next section discusses more of the impacts of intelligence sharing. 
D. IMPACT OF INTELLIGENCE SHARING  
The fears postulated by members of the U.S. government were coming true as 
inspection after inspection revealed no WMD in Iraq. Ostensibly, the U.S. had been 
duped by Saddam Hussein, its allies, and its own people into going to war for the wrong 
reasons. More importantly, the impact this had both domestically and internationally on 
U.S. credibility was astounding.  
The intelligence communities’ worlds, across the spectrum, had been literally 
turned upside down as new bureaucracies were being created to “streamline” rather than 
“stovepipe” information flow. The CIA –already under scrutiny because of Aldrich 
Ames, India’s nuclear testing, not to mention their inability to prevent 9/11 – lost much 
of what was left of its reputation because of this intelligence debacle. Likewise, the DIA 
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was repeatedly criticized for not questioning sources used. The Office of Special Plans – 
created by U.S. Secretary of Defense at the time, Donald Rumsfield, and headed by 
Douglas Feith, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, specifically for gathering 
intelligence to support invasion – was disbanded and its members brought under intense 
scrutiny. In order to prevent this from happening again, agencies such as the Office of the 
Department of National Intelligence (ODNI), the National Counterproliferation Center 
(NCPC), and the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC), were created to more 
effectively manage and control information flow. Similarly, plans such as the Information 
Sharing Environment (ISE) and parts of the USA PATRIOT Act were also implemented 
to break down cultural barriers and increase the cross flow of information.  
The U.S. military itself was strongly impacted as well. Iraq’s WMD scare led U.S. 
military installations to ramp up force protection measures, while units focused on 
techniques to protect themselves in a nuclear, biological, or chemical environment during 
sustained combat. Soldiers were extensively trained and drilled on the donning of 
protective equipment, the use of dosimeters, and deliberate as well as field expedient 
decontamination techniques. Additionally, troops underwent mass inoculations against 
anthrax and smallpox both in theater and before deploying because of reported biological 
weapons threats.186 
If the impact at the domestic level seems extensive, then the impact at the 
international level was monumental. Specifically, the largest impact was on U.S. 
credibility with other states. In addition, it produced “doubts about the legitimacy of 
America’s actions and created widespread anxiety about how the U.S. would use its 
powers in the future.”187 Muslims worldwide also began boycotting American goods like 
Coca Cola and Seven-Up buying “Mecca Cola” and “Muslim-Up” instead.188  
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The WMD fiasco also affected Britain’s credibility, damaging U.S. relations with 
Britain and other allies.189 For example, a renowned Indian newspaper stated, “Even if 
under American people’s pressure, he [President Bush] quits office, the situation would 
not undergo any change for the basic goal of the imperialist US system is to capture the 
whole world. In such circumstances, India should take a fresh look at India-US relations 
so that unlike Pakistan, it could be saved from becoming a satellite US state.”190 The fact 
that the U.S. never found a “smoking gun” also affected worldwide opinion of the UN. In 
particular, it has been posited that the “UN had become corrupted by the United States 
essentially becoming a puppet of US interests” and is likewise no longer relevant during 
international conflict.191  
Overall these domestic and international impacts have had a lasting effect on U.S. 
soft and hard power. Furthermore, it will take time, transparency, and diplomatic 
persuasion for the U.S. to rebound from the perceptions the invasion of Iraq has caused. 
More importantly, the U.S. must learn from its mistakes identifying barriers and 
challenges that led to this case’s outcome in order to prevent the same thing from 
happening again.    
E. LESSONS LEARNED 
According to the “The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United 
States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction” by U.S. Senators Laurence Silbermann 
and Charles Robb, “the information sharing problem manifested itself in three specific 
ways: intelligence was not passed (1) from the collectors to the analysts; (2) from the 
analysts to the collectors; and (3) from foreign liaison services to the Intelligence 
Community.”192 The first two are systemic problems often created out of tendencies to 
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not trust those who do not mirror you. Oddly enough the two most notorious for this lack 
of trust operated under the same agency. The Directorate of Operations (field agents) and 
the Directorate of Intelligence (the analysts), two branches of the CIA, are generally leery 
when sharing information especially when it comes to sharing both raw information and 
analyzed intelligence with each other and policymakers as in the case of Iraq.193 For 
example, sensitive HUMINT reports concerning Iraq’s alleged mobile biological labs and 
mapping software were restricted from analysts who may have disputed initial 
assumptions.194 
Both directorates had reasons for not trusting the other – namely, the protection of 
sources and methods. Likewise, policymakers were not trusted because of their 
propensity to only hear what they want to hear, disregarding all else. Additionally, there 
were political barriers that existed between collectors, analysts, and policymakers. In 
particular, policymakers used whatever bit of information available to support their desire 
to overthrow Saddam Hussein whether it pertained to WMD or not. George Tenet 
recalled a meeting in early 2002, among White House officials, where he reported that 
the probability of Iraq continuing their WMD program was minimal. In response, Vice-
President Dick Cheney stated that, although there is currently no intelligence showing 
Iraq was still pursuing WMD, there was likewise no evidence to prove that they were 
not.195  
Another issue was the stovepiping of information. In this case, the DCI was 
ultimately in charge of all intelligence collection, reporting, and analysts while 
simultaneously the principal intelligence advisor to the President. Although this 
arrangement may ostensibly appear as streamlined, it actually hampered objective 
analysis. For example, the CIA tested aluminum tubes identical to the ones discovered in 
Iraq possibly for centrifuge rotors. The DOE wanted to participate in the testing 
considering this was one of their specialties. However, the DOE was denied access to the  
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testing results and were told that they could not participate “because we funded it. It was 
our testing. We were trying to prove some things that we wanted to prove with the 
testing. It wasn’t a joint effort.”196 
The third problem, identified by Silbermann and Robb, reflects the distrustful 
nature between foreign governments. Knowingly, allies only offer up information that is 
beneficial and contextually risk free rather than openly sharing raw information. 
Similarly, the use of spies, even among allies, is proof that neither state truly believes the 
others openness or capabilities to collect and analyze all information. This behavioral and 
cultural question of trust erodes effective intelligence sharing.  Moreover, the United 
States’ over-reliance on questionable foreign sources compounded the issue. 
Behaviorally, the U.S. has an inherently distrustful disposition with anyone who is seen 
to be opposed to U.S. positions. For example, the British feared the United States would 
no longer view Britain as an ally if they did not tell the U.S. what they believed they 
wanted to hear. Similarly, President Musharaf feared the United States would invade 
Pakistan had they not supported the United States.  
From a cultural aspect, the U.S. believed that it was their duty to overthrow 
Saddam Hussein. As self-professed protectors of human rights, global peace, and security 
the United States found Saddam Hussein a plausible target – one that would get the 
attention of other immoral actors in the world and make the world safer. The probability 
of Iraq having WMD gave the United States a reasonable excuse to invade or at least a 
reason that was publicly consumable. At the international level, some members of the 
European Union never truly trusted U.S. motives and intentions and therefore never 
directly supported war efforts but still provided some support because of their historical 
NATO ties.  
Although difficult, each barrier could have been overcome. The behavioral 
barriers internal to the CIA could have been resolved through increased interaction and 
reciprocation on both the Directorate of Operations and Intelligence. Externally, cultural 
and behavioral barriers could have been overcome through openness and transparency 
                                                 
196 “Conclusion of Senate’s Iraq Report: Report on the prewar intelligence assessments.” 
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between states as well as having ambassadors who have a strong rapport with each other 
– a lesson that should have been learned from the Cuban Missile Crisis. Likewise, it is 
implausible to believe that all external and internal barriers could not have been eroded 
had there been increased truthful information sharing between all parties involved. In 
sum, the best way to prevent another debacle, such as the one the U.S. currently finds 
itself in, is through openly sharing all the available intelligence and potential doubts 
about it with allies even if it may not support political goals or aspirations. More to the 
point, this case shows that extensive intelligence sharing is not the only catalyst for a 
successful counterproliferation operation; the quality and motives for sharing are also 
significant factors.  
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V.  CONCLUSION  
This thesis has shown how information sharing has impacted counterproliferation 
efforts in an attempt to determine if it is possible to prevent the spread of WMD material 
and related technology through increased intelligence sharing. Specifically, it has looked 
at three distinct case studies as a means of determining whether or not increased 
information flow actually leads to a more effective collective security action. 
Theoretically, by increasing intelligence sharing you increase trust among allies and also 
have a greater probability of connecting valuable pieces of information – unimportant 
individually but collectively valuable – which equates to more effective collective action. 
Rationally, being able to “connect the dots” more thoroughly reduces the probability of 
making a wrong decision or action. Likewise, just as in the “Prisoner’s Dilemma” game 
where there are increased rewards for cooperation as opposed to joint deception, there 
should be mutually beneficial rewards for increased intelligence sharing. However, each 
case studied suggested something different. This chapter will compare the extent, 
challenges, and impact intelligence sharing had on each case in order to assess the 
hypothesis that intelligence sharing does have a substantial impact on 
counterproliferation operations. More importantly, if the hypothesis holds true, it will 
recommend ways to increase the amount and quality of information shared.  
A. CASE COMPARISON 
This section focuses on comparing the three cases in order to determine the role of 
intelligence sharing. In effect it will look at three dimensions of information sharing on 
each case – the extent, the number of challenges, and potential impacts. This section will 
also compare the lessons learned from each case in order to determine if there is a trend 




1.  Extent of Information Sharing 
The So San incident demonstrated how effective bilateral sharing could lead to 
successful interdiction operations even though overall counterproliferation operations 
could be construed as a failure. In this case study the United States shared information 
about the contents and possible destination of the So San with Cambodia, South Korea, 
and Japan as well as Yemen – the receiver of the North Korean SCUDs. The United 
States also shared all its intelligence with Spain in order to get the Spanish Navy to 
conduct the actual interdiction operation. Similarly, the BBC China interdiction also 
relied on intelligence sharing but among a larger number of partners. In this case, by 
widely dispersing intelligence gathered, the United States greatly enhanced the 
probability of success. Specifically, it can be postulated that, had it not been for the 
effective intelligence sharing between Britain, the United States, the Malaysian and 
Pakistani governments, Germany, Italy, Egypt, and various classified sources, the Khan 
network may still be in operation and Libya would be considered an emerging nuclear 
threat. 
However, the last case study demonstrated how the extent of intelligence sharing 
was both momentous and detrimental. In the beginning, sharing efforts between the 
United States and its allies with the UN were sound and professional. In particular, 
Israel’s Mossad intelligence on Iraq’s past capability and potential WMD sites, Britain’s 
HUMINT reports, and the United States all-source analysis greatly benefited UN 
investigations. Conversely, when inspectors left for the first time in 1998 the United 
States continued its pursuit of WMD and began relying on any shared information, even 
if faulty or politicized, in order to support their claims that Iraq still had WMD. In this 
case, it was not so much the extent of intelligence being shared but the quality of that 
information that was most significant. 
Overall, it can be presumed from the comparison that there is a positive 
correlation between the extent of intelligence shared and the probability of success. This 
implies that by extending the amount and quality of information shared to as many states 
as possible the United States could conceivably increase the overall success rate of its 
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counterproliferation efforts. Of particular note, it seems that by increasing the quality as 
well as extent of intelligence shared, the greater probability of success.  
2. Challenges to Information Sharing 
The challenges encountered during the So San centered on the lack of 
transparency among all involved. In particular, lack of transparency by Yemeni President 
Saleh – as to whom the recipient of the SCUDs was – allowed the United States to 
interdict the shipment without fear of losing an ally. However, when the cargo was later 
deemed legal and the U.S. reluctantly allowed the ship and its cargo to continue, the 
United States lost credibility with its other ally Spain. Moreover, it forced the United 
States to choose between competing priorities – counterproliferation and counterterrorism 
– for future support. Had there been increased transparency between Yemen, the United 
States, and Spain, the more effective the counterproliferation operation would have been 
and conversely the less impact this interdiction would have had on U.S. relations. 
Therefore, it can be construed that increasing intelligence sharing does increase 
probability of success. 
On the other hand, the challenges in Chapter III revolved around the fear of 
inadvertent sharing and the challenge of collecting intelligence on dual use technology. 
Incidentally, the latter challenge –dual use technology – has proven to be a difficult and 
persistent challenge to overcome when dealing with WMD.  The challenge of inadvertent 
sharing stems from the number of states involved in the interdiction. To illustrate, before 
the actual interdiction occurred the United States worked somewhat exclusively with 
Britain. However after learning of the BBC China shipment, intelligence sharing between 
the United States, Britain, Germany, Italy, Malaysia, and Pakistan went into full force. 
The main challenge was determining when to turn on the information flow in order to 
prevent leakage of information. Thus, increasing intelligence sharing would not equate to 
increased probability of success but rather an increased probability of disclosure.  
Although initially the challenges found in the Iraq case study were minimal, the 
challenges encountered later rested not only with the problem of dual use technology but 
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more so with the lack of quality, unpoliticized, intelligence sharing between multiple 
allies and the United States. Specifically, the use of non-credible sources and the 
unwillingness of intelligence agencies to verify information compounded by Saddam 
Hussein’s deception plan and misinterpretation of actions – by both Saddam and the 
United States – inevitably led to war. Thus, it seems from this case that increasing 
intelligence sharing would actually lead to not only a greater probability of success but 
also a greater probability of avoiding unnecessary war. Conceivably, had Saddam 
Hussein shared his intentions for deceiving potential adversaries with the United States, it 
could be assumed that a mutually acceptable alternative to war could have been devised 
between the United States and Iraq. 
3. Impact of Information Sharing 
The impact of the So San interdiction both helped and impaired future 
counterproliferation operations. Particularly, it spawned one of the greatest yet often 
debated counterproliferation efforts of today – the PSI. Conversely, the lack of 
transparency by the United States with Spain, in particular, and other allies led to the 
perception that the United States was inconsistent in its foreign policy – often choosing 
counterterrorism over counterproliferation – and that it is not a trustworthy ally. 
Therefore, the lack of transparency was detrimental to future U.S. counterproliferation 
operations. Along similar lines, the impact the BBC China interdiction had a profound 
impact and has often been referred to as a sign for increased information sharing among 
allies. Above all, the interdiction led to the ending of A.Q. Khan’s network, Libya’s 
abandonment of WMD, and amplified PSI activities.  
Likewise, the impact of the United States’ decision to invade Iraq stemmed 
mainly from the lack of transparency among members. Specifically, the invasion caused 
the U.S. intelligence community and government, in whole, to lose credibility 
domestically and internationally. In response, the United States began reorganizing – as it 
typically does when faced with failures – creating several new agencies and concepts. At 
the international level, the United States’ loss of credibility has had a more lasting impact 
than at the domestic level on all future operations not just counterproliferation. For 
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example, how can the United States make credible claims that Iran is a potentially 
dangerous nuclear state when it made similar unsubstantiated claims about Iraq? Overall, 
this supports the hypothesis that by increasing intelligence sharing – in particular 
transparency – there is a corresponding increase in the probability of success in 
counterproliferation operations. Partial sharing or deception, in which some important 
information is held back, created problems that could have been avoided by fuller, more 
open sharing. 
4. Lessons Learned 
Each case studied had its own particular lessons to be learned from the operation. 
The So San demonstrated the need for tighter export control measures, increased sharing 
with members of the CSI as well as PSI, and better transparency between states with 
bilateral ties. The BBC China incident demonstrated that sharing intelligence creates 
positive momentum as long as it is done with exact timing and with those specifically 
impacted by the operation. Likewise, the case of Iraq verified the need for increased 
interaction and reciprocation of information sharing among domestic as well as 
international agencies. Moreover, the Iraq case showed that the best way to prevent 
another situation like Iraq is through openly sharing all the available intelligence with 
allies even if it may not support political goals. In particular, policymakers’ attempt to 
retain job security and plausible deniability through the institution of vague policies and 
political rhetoric – to both the intelligence community and the public – seems to be a 
major contributor to the lack of intelligence sharing. 
B.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
After looking at the comparisons of each case studied and understanding the 
theoretical importance of intelligence sharing, the question remains: Should we increase 
the amount of intelligence shared, and is it worth the risks? This section breaks down the 
proposed recommendations into two sections. First, it addresses recommendations for 
overcoming common obstacles. Secondly, it addresses the more important question of, 
given the inherent risks and barriers, is it worth it?  
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1. Overcoming Obstacles 
As seen throughout this thesis, there are numerous challenges and risks to sharing 
intelligence. In point of fact each case studied showed how the inherent risks affected the 
level and intensity of intelligence shared. Subsequently, as time progressed the United 
States has made several attempts at counteracting the inherent risks of inadvertent sharing 
and the protection of sources and methods. Notably, PSI and ISE have provided 
adequately structured measures to offset these risks. In particular, the practice of only 
sharing information with the state directly affected and with those needed to conduct the 
operation minimizes problems of inadvertent sharing. Although, it does create the 
problem of determining who gets to decide what is shared with whom and what is 
important.  
A similar issue and also one that has proven harder to overcome is the issue of 
trust. These cases explicitly prove that the issues and challenges often found are not of a 
technological nature – although, that would make it easier to fix. The chief contributor to 
the behavioral, cultural, and political challenges often encountered is the intriguing 
problem of trust. Lack of trust is what has led to over-classification; it is the genesis 
behind the “Cold War” mentality of many decision makers; it is a motivation for the 
creation of politicized intelligence; and it is the reason the United States has been 
struggling trying to balance the need for sharing with the need for secrecy. Thus, the 
United States should not use barriers as an excuse as to whether or not intelligence should 
be shared. Instead, the decision to share should be based on level of trust and risk 
orientation.  
By taking small measured steps – focusing on a common goal (i.e., 
counterproliferation), increasing transparency in decision making and operations 
conducted, and being accountable for successes as well as failures – the United States 
could slowly regain lost trust among allies. Some of the most notable steps that could be 
done are increased joint military operations and exercises, increased cultural recognition 
and status of allied states, and a willingness to take a less risk averse approach when 
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working with foreign partners. By doing some of the aforementioned steps the U.S. could 
regain and even increase other nations’ trust in the United States.  
2. To Share or Not to Share 
These cases and the theoretical views postulated have demonstrated that there is a 
positive correlation between the level of intelligence sharing and the probability of 
success in counterproliferation. Inherently, there is also a positive correlation between the 
level of trust and the extent of intelligence sharing. Therefore, although “intelligence 
sharing is a potentially risky, if sometimes necessary, enterprise,…[it] need not be 
dismissed as a pointless exercise or one that is so fraught with danger that is should never 
be attempted.”197 More importantly, it has been proven a critical catalyst in 
counterproliferation success.198 Therefore, the initial hypothesis that increased 
information sharing among allies causes more effective security cooperation and is 
therefore necessary for combating the spread of WMD, is generally true.  
Likewise, although intelligence sharing involves challenges and risks, the 
inevitable spread of WMD and increasing threat to U.S. as well as global security has 
made increased collaboration between allies necessary. To reiterate, intelligence sharing 
only increases the odds of success, but it is not a guarantee since there are other factors – 
namely, geopolitical and fear of putting one’s own national security at risk – that can 
produce failure. To close, by increasing intelligence sharing the United States sends a 
message to those corrupt state and non-state actors that, as so eloquently phrased by 
Thomas Barnett, “If you believe you can get away with it forever, you are wrong. If you 
believe no one cares, you are wrong. And if you believe America cannot and will not stop 
you if you seek to acquire WMD, you are more than wrong – you do not belong in our 
future.”199  
                                                 
197 Ellis and Kiefer, 143. 
198 Froscher, 467–468. 
199 Barnett, 331. 
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